


DOCUMENTS ON INNER MONGOLIA

**Selected U.S. Intelligence Reports (Declassified)
on Leaders and Factions in Inner Mongolia, 1946-1949**

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DOCUMENTS ON
INNER MONGOLIA

More than two regimes in Peking seem to be vying for the territory of Inner Mongolia. The efforts of the government to bring nationalistic areas to a state of noticeable signs of development.

The Cultural Revolution has been a complex and disruptive force in Inner Mongolia. Nationalism was a major factor in the involvement of the region in economic and social development in China during the 1950s. This was another troublesome period.

Indications are that the Cultural Revolution in Mongolia by the Chinese government has affected three of its seven provinces. It is known to have been a major factor in the League to Heilungkiang and Liaoning. Some part of the region has been partitioned, and this partitioning, in part, has been reduced to 7,000 square kilometers. The 1967 all-time high was reached.

Prior to the Cultural Revolution, the membership of the Communist Party in the restructured provinces of Inner Mongolia was in positions of secret leadership. The regional revolution in the regional military command has been planned.

To be sure, the Chinese Communists of successive regimes have better understood the region. They have inherited the reports on the region which were recently released to the Department of State.

Of the three reports released to the Central Intelligence Agency, "political information" was the most important.

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FOREWORD

More than two decades after rising to power in China, the Communist regime in Peking seems still to have its hands full trying to unify the territory of Inner Mongolia and unite its people and nationalities. But, the efforts of the government notwithstanding, this first of China's many nationality areas to be established, has become also the first to show very noticeable signs of disintegration.

The Cultural Revolution in Inner Mongolia had been extremely complex and disruptive, due to the fact that not only Party authority but also Mongol nationalism was given to controversy. And this had brought about the involvement of the Chinese People's Liberation Army in the political, economic and social affairs of the region to a greater extent than anywhere in China during the turmoil, with the possible exception of Tibet, which was another troublesome spot for the Chinese Communists.

Indications are that the unsettled conditions generated in Inner Mongolia by the Cultural Revolution have remained to this day. As a result, three of its seven leagues, comprising over one-third of its total area, are known to have been transferred to neighboring provinces: the Hulunbuir League to Heilungkiang, the Jerim League to Kirin, and the Joo-uda League to Liaoning. Some banners located in the Bayan Nor League in the western part of the region have also been assigned to Ninghsia and Kansu. With all this partitioning, it is believed that the population of Inner Mongolia has been reduced to 7,000,000 (of which 500,000 to 600,000 are Mongols) from the 1967 all-time high of 13,000,000.

Prior to the Cultural Revolution, Mongols made up more than one-half of the membership of the local hierarchy. Today, only one Mongol remains in the restructured regional leadership. He is Wu T'ao, who holds the positions of secretary in the regional Party committee, vice-chairman in the regional revolutionary committee (government), and political commissar in the regional military command. Incidentally, the regional military command has been placed under the direct control of the Peking military area.

To be sure, the problem of Mongol nationalism is not the woe of the Chinese Communists alone. Before them, it has defied solution by the leaders of successive regimes in China. To help the student of Chinese affairs to better understand certain aspects of the problem which the Chinese Communists have inherited, the Center has compiled this volume of selected U.S. intelligence reports on leaders and factions in Inner Mongolia from 1946 to 1949, which were recently declassified from hitherto secret government files by the Department of State.

Of the thirty-three documents in this group of intelligence reports released to the Center for distribution, twenty-eight were classified as "political information" and the rest as "military information". Nineteen

reports bear dates indicating that the information was gathered between 1946 and 1949. Identified in the reports as sources of information are various kinds of people from a "young lama" to a "Japanese language instructor", and from a "Chinese civil administrator" to a "Chinese Communist underground worker". Interspersed in the text are brief comments or explanations, such as "Peiping Note", "Shanghai Note", and "Washington Note", which presumably were written by officials of the American consulates in Peiping and Shanghai and by staff members of the State Department or of some other Federal agency in Washington, respectively.

The documents released to the Center are copies made from type-written versions prepared at different times and on different machines with different types. Some of these are not very legible. To remove some of the defects, the Center found it worthwhile to have all the documents typed over. In the course of retyping work no serious effort was made to correct the typing errors in the original materials. Names of persons and places in romanization were for the most part unchanged, while names in Chinese were copied from the originals wherever possible. However, personal names which appeared in Mongolian writing have been eliminated since they were not clear enough to be copied. The map on Page 40 of this book was redrawn by a member of the Center's staff to increase its readability. Then, to make it easier for the reader to use all these materials, another staff member was assigned to prepare the subject index and the name index appearing at the end of the book.

This is not the first time that the Department of State has released its materials that may be of research value to the academic community through the Center. It began giving its support to the Center even before the latter's formal launching in May 1968, when Mr. Eugene Wu, Librarian of the Harvard-Yenching Library of Harvard University, was still attending to the affairs of the Center in a temporary capacity. We at the Center hope that such support will be forthcoming just as readily in the future so that we may effectively realize our task of uncovering significant Chinese source materials for the academic community, wherever they may lie hidden.

P. K. Yu, Director
Center for Chinese Research Materials
Association of Research Libraries

Washington, D. C.
March 1972

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SUBJECT Political Information
Help to Prince

DATE OF INFORMATION: 23

SOURCE For all paragraphs
Dorjy; confirm
for paragraph

1. ERINCHIN DORJY, chief
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and Ch'engte (117-52)

2. Upon arriving in Peiping
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Twelfth War Area Head
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3. Finally ERINCHIN DORJY
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4. ERINCHIN DORJY (the
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5. He is fifty-five years
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6. Between the ages of
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SUBJECT Political Information: Central Government Rejects Help to Prince Erinchin Dorjy of Inner Mongolia NO 3889

DATE OF INFORMATION: 23 December 1948

SOURCE For all paragraphs except paragraph 9: interview with Erinchin Dorjy; confirmation by Mongolian Intellectuals in Peiping except for paragraph 9, for which source is secretary to the Panchan Lama.

1. ERINCHIN DORJY, chief of the so-called Shile-Buriat Banner (see paragraph 6) decided in October 1948 to visit Peiping and from there to go to Nanking for a conference with Generalissimo CHIANG Kai-shek. After fifty-seven days on the road he arrived in Peiping via Telun (Delun ?, 116-25,42-10) and Ch'engte (117-52,40-59).
2. Upon arriving in Peiping, he asked various members of the Central Government to help him but with almost no success. First, no transportation to Nanking was offered him, second, the Eleventh War Area Headquarters, the Twelfth War Area Headquarters, and the President's Peiping Headquarters all turned down his plea for a Central Government offensive into Inner Mongolia against the Communists. They also refused to give him arms and ammunition with which to fight the Communist Eighth Route Army. On his way to Peiping he had also asked help from Nationalist officers whom he met, but their answer always was that it was too cold to fight in Inner Mongolia during the winter. The only material help he had received was 100 rifles and 1000 rounds of ammunition from the governor of Jehol province (LIU Te-ch'ban 劉德蕃).
3. Finally ERINCHIN DORJY became very despondent when some of the Mongolian delegates to the National Assembly told him that there was no hope for co-operation between the Inner Mongolians and the Central Government. At present he does not know what his future plans will be.
4. ERINCHIN DORJY (the prince's own English spelling of his Mongolian name) has the Russian alias of OCHIROFF but no Chinese name. He speaks, reads, and writes Russian, Japanese and Mongolian but neither understands nor speaks the Chinese language.
5. He is fifty-five years old, is about six feet tall, and weighs about three hundred pounds. His face is light for an Oriental and his upper front teeth are missing.
6. Between the ages of twenty-two and thirty he was at the Tsar's college in St. Petersburg. Then he returned to the land of the Buriat Mongols where he was a prince and the chief of the Aga Banner (approximately 115-05,51-20) in Aga League. There he became one of the leaders of the exodus of Mongols who were leaving Russia to escape communization. In 1921 four thousand Buriat families arrived in Hailar. In 1929 two thousand of these Buriat families with ERINCHIN DORJY as their leader moved from Hailar to their present location, which is the area between the sources of the Helin and Silin Rivers to a point about fifty miles past their junction, partly in Meshikten Banner (117-20,43-20) of Chaowuta League and partly in Abaga Left Banner (115-49,43-41) of Silingel League. The nobility of northern Silingol League invited some of the "refugee Buriats" to live in other areas to help

administer the banner governments since the education of the Buriats was higher than that of the Silingols. Consequently, the Buriats are now established in all the northern banners of the Silingol leagues. After the Buriats became established, they were visited by the Panchan Lama, who said that they were to be considered his wards because of their peculiar status.

7. Even after the rise in power of the Japanese and the subsequent placing of Prince TE as the head of the Mengchiang Government, no change occurred in the relationship between the Buriats and other Mongols. Although Prince TE did not officially recognize the Buriats as an autonomous unit, he actually left them to govern their own affairs.
8. From the time of the visit of the Panchan Lama until the arrival of members of the Chinese Communist-sponsored Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement Association there was little contact between ERINCHIN DORJY and the rest of China.
(Peiping note: This was indicated by his very slight knowledge of General FU Tse-yi, WULJI OCHAR, and YUN Tse.)
9. When the Soviet and Outer Mongolian armies occupied Inner Mongolia in 1944, they did try to conciliate ERINCHIN DORJY by offering him 10,000 head of sheep and 100 head of cattle, but he refused the gift because he was not in sympathy with Soviet policy.
10. The arrival of the agents of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement Association and their work among the Inner Mongolian youth caused ERINCHIN DORJY to resist the Communist movement. He attempted to keep his banner well-policed and refused to allow the entrance of agents of the autonomous movement into his territory.
(Peiping note: How much the movement has managed to penetrate northern Silingol League is not known.)
11. ERINCHIN DORJY states that he has 1,000 men in his banner waiting to fight the Eighth Route Army, but he has only 100 rifles and a little ammunition in his area and has managed to secure 100 more rifles in Peiping.
(Peiping note: With such a small amount of war materials it will be impossible for him to do little more than exercise police control temporarily in his own banner although he claims to represent all of northern Silingol League. He may represent all of the nobility of northern Silingol League, but the nobility is no longer able to issue orders as they once were accustomed to do. ERINCHIN DORJY represents an important military factor only if his forces are armed by the Nationalists, an action which does not seem probable.)
12. Mongolian intellectuals in Peiping state that the failure of ERINCHIN DORJY's mission illustrates how little the Kuomintang understands the Mongolian question. They point out that it would be impossible for ERINCHIN DORJY not to cooperate with the Central Government because it is his only chance to retain his power. As a member of the nobility and a Russian emigrant, he could not even exist in Outer Mongolia or the USSR. ERINCHIN DORJY is a prince who was taught to believe in the greatness of the Mongolian aristocracy. He objects not only to the agents of the Inner Mongolian

Autonomous Movement Association the "Japanese-educated" nobility.

(Peiping note: In this Prince TE. Prince TE's the fact that he is of nobility confirm this.)

ERINCHIN DORJY is becoming cause of the indifference lack of knowledge of the Central Government is bringing to sell out Inner Mongolia position.)

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Autonomous Movement Association but also to the activities and ideas of
the "Japanese-educated" Inner Mongolians who are for the overthrow of the
nobility.

(Peiping note: In this respect ERINCHIN DORJY differs markedly from
Prince TE. Prince TE's followers state that TE is hardly cognizant of
the fact that he is of noble birth and his actions and manners seem to
confirm this.

ERINCHIN DORJY is becoming embittered toward the Central Government be-
cause of the indifference of government authorities in Peiping. Only the
lack of knowledge of current Inner Mongolian affairs can explain why the
Central Government is not making use of ERINCHIN DORJY, who would be will-
ing to sell out Inner Mongolian autonomy if allowed to keep his own feudal
position.)

SUBJECT Political Information: Biographical Sketch and Opinions of Prince TE, Inner Mongolia

NO 4073

DATE OF INFORMATION: Unstated

SOURCE Chinese civil administrator

Biographical Information

Prince TE or TE WANG (德.德王), whose Mongolian name is DEMCHIGTUNRUB, was born of a noble family in the Silingol League, Right Sunit Banner. (112-53, 42-40), and has the Ch'in Wang (親王) rank. He is forty-five years old. He received most of early education at the Mongolian School in Peiping and finished his education under a private tutor in his home banner. At the age of nineteen he became vice-head of the Silingol League and has been in Mongolian politics ever since.

TE is not in sympathy with the former feudal system of rule among the Mongolians. In 1933, stirred by the political conditions in Western Inner Mongolia under Chinese administration, he called on thirty odd leaders of the various leagues and banners to come to Pailingmiao (110-30,41-50). At this conference TE demanded that the leaders request the Chinese Government to give the Inner Mongolians a high degree of autonomy. After numerous negotiations in 1934 the Nanking Government agreed to the formation of the Mongolian Districts Autonomous Political Affairs Council. This council was under the leadership and supervision of the Chinese Government at Nanking. Little was accomplished because the Chinese constantly did everything they could to disrupt the work of the council. Many acts of violence occurred, such as the assassination of TE's secretary, Han Fong-lin (韓鳳林). To get away from dangers for a time, TE returned to his home in Right Sunit Banner.

In 1936 a military government was established at Tehua (Chiapser 113-58,42-02) with the secret aid of the Japanese Kwantung Army. YUN Wang was made the head of this government and TE the vice-head. YUN's leadership was only nominal; TE was actually the leader.

In 1937 a Mongolian Associated Autonomous Government was established with the same two men in charge. Upon the death of YUN in 1938 TE openly took over control. The government was reorganized and its name changed to Mongolian Allied Autonomous Government. Until the end of World War II TE remained the head of this government.

For two or three years before the surrender of the Japanese he frequently became discontented with the policies of the Kwantung Army Headquarters and was continually "escaping" to his home. At one time during the Japanese regime when Inner Mongolia was promised autonomy, TE was so happy that he decided to erase the last symbol of his feudalistic ideas by cutting off his queue. The common people admire the fact that despite his noble birth, he advocates democratic government for Inner Mongolia. It is the opinion of many Mongols that if Inner Mongolia were suddenly given its autonomy, TE would probably be the first leader and remain in that position until a successor could be elected by popular vote of the people.

Despite reports to government, is not the Chinese government that Prince TE had Pacification Commission vote the rest of his equality for the Inner

When TE went to China TE return to Peiping Chinese Government. A refused the position until Inner Mongolia as a loan. (Shangsum be increased to request was granted money.) During his aides, and his personal possessions, and worries about enthusiasm. His troops of the Mongolian first secretary was prince's family was (Princess TE), DU (son), OKIR-MOH (

Prince TE's Opinions

Prince TE believes Mongolians correct

- a. They treat
- b. They consider
- c. They are leaders power.
- d. They are Chinese

The Inner Mongolians the sovereignty not want Chinese tory. However, every month.

Because of racial Mongolian People's Republicians consider a low grade of government to give Inner Mongolian People's Republic hope to swing it accept communization

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Despite reports to the contrary, TE has no official position in the Chinese government, is not the leader of the western Mongols, and is not the tool of the Chinese government. (Shanghai comment: It had been reported in November that Prince TE had been appointed by Executive Yuan to the position of Pacification Commissioner for Inner Mongolia.) TE states that he will devote the rest of his years and all his energy to gain autonomy and racial equality for the Inner Mongolians.

When TE went to Chungking in November 1945, CHIANG Kai-shek suggested that TE return to Peiping and act as an advisor on Mongolian affairs for the Chinese Government. A salary of CNC \$1,000,000 per month was stipulated. TE refused the position stating that he would never act in an official capacity until Inner Mongolia was given its autonomy, but he agreed to take the money as a loan. (Shanghai comment: it has been reported that TE requested that the sum be increased to CNC \$5,000,000 because of the high cost of living. The request was granted three months ago but the prince has not yet received the money.) During the past year TE has had such a hard time supporting himself, his aides, and his servants that he is having to sell his few remaining personal possessions. The pressure of financial difficulties, disappointments and worries about his family has caused a marked decline in his health and enthusiasm. His wife, daughter and two sons were taken to Ulan Bator (?) by troops of the Mongolian People's Republic. (Shanghai comment: Prince TE's first secretary reported last September that the following members of the prince's family were taken to Dzamiir? Ubde? (44-30,111-14) RINCHIN'POR'LI (Princess TE), DURGNI-CAP (eldest son, aged 29), WONDON (son), ORUR-B-CHU (son), OKIR-MOH (son), and S'TU'HASUN (married daughter).

Prince TE's Opinions on Inner Mongolian Problem

Prince TE believes that most Chinese officials are failing to handle the Mongolians correctly because:

- a. They treat the Mongolians as an inferior race.
- b. They consider the Mongolian problem as regional instead of racial.
- c. They are trying to control the Western Mongols through former feudal leaders, who are interested only in holding their former wealth and power.
- d. They are trying to hold down the Mongolian race by diffusion with Chinese (Hans), by oppression, and by the encouragement of Lamaism.

The Inner Mongolians would like to become a dominion under China and lean on the sovereignty of China in the field of international affairs, but they do not want Chinese economic, political, or military penetration of their territory. However, the possibility of such a relationship is becoming more remote every month.

Because of racial similarity the Inner Mongolians are friendly with the Mongolian People's Republic although they do not like its government. Outer Mongolians consider Inner Mongolians inferior because of lack of military strength, low grade of government, and low educational standards. If the Chinese fail to give Inner Mongolia autonomy, Inner Mongolia will eventually ask the Mongolian People's Republic for aid and accept its form of government. They would hope to swing it away from Communism, but if that should fail they would accept communization in preference to domination by China.

The problem confronting the USSR in the area is whether or not to take over Inner Mongolia by sending in the troops of the Mongolian People's Republic. Besides inviting criticism from other nations, this would necessitate USSR combination over the probable union of Inner and Outer Mongolia. Since Inner Mongolia covers more territory and has a greater population than Outer Mongolia, there is a possibility that the Inner Mongolians could dominate the government. Foreseeing such a problem the USSR left agents in Inner Mongolia on their withdrawal last year. The Inner Mongolians prefer the interest of the United States and would welcome American advisors and observers.

SUBJECT Political Information on MEDELТУ of I

DATE OF INFORMATION: December

SOURCE Japanese, language

1. MEDELТУ, (MO-TE-ERH-TU) District (Shanghai not Self Protection Army, in the former Hsangan.
2. Source had his first was a staff officer of Garrison Army. At the Japanese Cadet School an instructor in the active and a superior the rank of lieutenant Third Cavalry Regiment
3. Because of an unfortunate The regions of former particularly large was discovered at Tai ing contraband, he was Kikan. Colonel KANAC thing" for such a su thing like two pound Tsitsihar Kempei Tai However, MEDELТУ was KANAGANA as an offic
4. In 1944 he was trans became the commander position he held un superior soldiers of officer.)
5. On 9 August 1945 wh cadet academy recei around Wangyehmiao. zations (Communist immediately led his ship to the Soviet
6. When the Beaton M made commander of reorganized and th People's Self Prot district.

SUBJECT Political Information: Biographical Sketch
on MEDELTU of Inner Mongolia

NO 4684

DATE OF INFORMATION: December 1946, except as stated

SOURCE Japanese, language instructor

1. MEDELTU, (MO-TE-ERH-TU or MO-P'O-ERH-TUAN), Commander of the 1st Army District (Shanghai note: and 1st Division of the Inner Mongolian People's Self Protection Army, was born in 1911 in Eastern Betha Banner (unlocated) in the former Hsingan East Province.)
2. Source had his first contact with MEDELTU in 1953, at which time MEDELTU was a staff officer of the rank of captain attached to the Hsingan East Garrison Army. At that time he was selected to be sent for training at the Japanese Cadet School. Upon graduation he returned to Manchukuo and became an instructor in the Hsiangan Military Academy at Wangyelmiao. He was very active and a superior officer with a promising future. He was promoted to the rank of lieutenant Colonel and became the commander of the Hsingan Third Cavalry Regiment which was stationed at Linhai (118-28, 43-32).
3. Because of an unfortunate incident he did not advance as far as expected. The regions of former Hsingan West Province produced opium; Linhsi was a particularly large production area. While enroute home for leave, MEDELTU was discovered at Taitsihar with two pounds of opium. Because he was carrying contraband, he was sent up for court martial. The head of the Totumu Kikan, Colonel KANACANA, heard about it and thought it would be a "sad thing" for such a superior Mongolian officer to fail because of "a little thing like two pounds of opium." The colonel communicated with the Tsitsihar Kempei Tai and the 9th Military District and had him acquitted. However, MEDELTU was relieved of his duties and was put back to work by KANAGANA as an officer attached to the 9th military district headquarters.
4. In 1944 he was transferred back to the Hsingan Military Cadet Academy and became the commander of the cadet corps of the instructors corps, which position he held until the end of the war. (The cadet corps was composed of superior soldiers of the HSINGAN ARMY chosen to be trained as noncommissioned officer.)
5. On 9 August 1945 when Soviet Russia declared war on Japan, the HSINGAN army cadet academy received orders to stop the Russian advance into the area around Wangyehmiao. On 11 August when the military and political organizations (Communist?) at Wangyehmiao began to withdraw to the south, MEDELTU immediately led his men into Wangyehmiao and "extended the hand of friendship to the Soviet Army."
6. When the Beaton Mongolian Self Autonomous Army was formed, MEDELTU was made commander of the 1st division. In May 1946 when the government was reorganized and the name of the army was changed to the Inner Mongolian People's Self Protection Army, he became the commander of the 1st military district.

7. MEDELTU is not extremely brilliant but does his work diligently and enthusiastically. During the days that he was instructor at the HSINGAN Military Academy, he was more demanding and strict than any other officer. He is very quick-tempered, argumentative, and excitable. He is known for his sharp tongue and for slandering people without restraint. Because of these weaknesses, there are many people who neither understand nor like him. When he thinks he is right, he tries to accomplish his objective immediately without consulting others. He is also prone not to study all sides of a question before making a decision. He showed his shortsightedness in February 1946 when NANIPATARA and his party went to Nanking to see the head of the Northeast Administration, General HSIUNG Shih-hui, to demand Eastern Mongolian Autonomy. When the news of the failure of the mission was transmitted to Wangyehmiao, it was rumored that MANIPATARA had been bought by the Kuomintang. Upon hearing this, MEDELTU immediately went to MANAPATARA's home with troops and disposed of MANAPATARA's assets, including his home. Another example of MEDELTU's shortsightedness was his desire to fight the 8th Route Army because the Chinese Communists put political advisors in the Inner Mongolian army in violation of previous agreements. ASCAN, commander in chief of the Inner Mongolian army, heard of MEDELTU's plan to fight and dissuaded him, dissuading an incident that would have been injurious to the future conduct of the Inner Mongolian political movement in Chinese Communist occupied territory. MEDELTU's future will depend upon the success of ASCAN.
8. At present MEDELTU is one of the outstanding persons in the Mongolian Political Movement. He is now in Tsitsihar as a student in the 8th Route Army Communist University.

SUBJECT Military In
People's S

DATE OF INFORMATION:

SOURCE As stated

Source for paras. 1-3

1. During the Japanese
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2. The Eastern Mongol
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3. In June 1946 the
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Source for para. 4:
from travelers from

4. As previously rep
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Source for para. 5:
Mongolian affairs d
until repatriation.

5. ASCAN was a stud
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lished, he bec
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Source for para. 6

his work diligently and enthusiastically at the HSINGAN Military School. He is more tactful than any other officer. He is very excitable. He is known for his lack of restraint. Because of this, he neither understands nor likes to accomplish his objective. He is also prone not to study all things. He showed his shortsightedness when his party went to Nanking to see General HSIUNG Shih-hui, to discuss the failure of the Japanese. He remembered that MANIPATARA had this, MEDELTU immediately went to see MANAPATARA's assets, in his shortsightedness was his fault. The Chinese Communists put him in violation of previous orders. The Inner Mongolian army, heard of this, dissuaded an incident that took place at the Inner Mongolian border territory. MEDELTU's

persons in the Mongolian army, a student in the 8th Route

SUBJECT Military Information: Inner Mongolian People's Self Protection Army, General Information. NO 4835

DATE OF INFORMATION: As stated

SOURCE As stated

Source for paras. 1-3: Japanese, Language Instructor Changehun

1. During the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, the armed strength of the Inner Mongolians was approximately 10,000 men, which included 12 cavalry regiments of approximately 600 men each, 2 artillery regiments of 300 men each, and 1 infantry regiment of 1500 men. These units were equipped and supplied by the Japanese. At the conclusion of the war most of the men returned to their homes since they were conscriptions.
2. The Eastern Mongolian Self Autonomous Army was formed from new recruits at the end of the war. There was at that time a maximum number of 6 divisions with 2,000 in each. (It is difficult to ascertain the size of this "autonomous" army because figures reported have varied from 9,000 to 70,000. The latter number may represent the potential strength rather than the actual strength since the source stated in November 1946 that the maximum number of rifles and pistols available in Hsingan Province (all four former Hsingan provinces?) was 60,000.)
3. In June 1946 the name of the army was changed to the Inner Mongolian People's Self Protection Army. (Shanghai note: The change was previously reported as taking place in May 1946.)

Source for para. 4: Chinese, ex-Army Officer Peiping from travelers from Inner Mongolia

4. As previously reported, ASGAN (Chinese phoneticization: AH-TS'E-KEN) became the commander-in-chief of the army (Shanghai note: and NACHIANCHOUGHOR, the commander of the 2nd Division. This division without NACHIANCHOUGHOR, went over to the Nationalists when they took over Tangliiao (122-14,43-40).

Source for para. 5: Japanese rescued analyst on Mongolian affairs during Japanese occupation and until repatriation. Changehun

5. ASGAN was a student at the Japanese Army University. Then he served as an instructor in the Hsingan Army School. At the same time he was a staff officer in the Hsingan army and Chief of the Military Affairs Section. When the East Mongolian People's Autonomy Government was set up, he served as Chief of the National Defense Section and Chief of the Military Affairs Section. In June 1946 when the Hsingan Provincial Government was established, he became Commander-in-chief of the Inner Mongolia People's Self Defense Army. He is a quiet and capable man and is popular among the army men.

Source for para. 6: Japanese, language instructor Changehun

6. MEDELTU (MO-TE-EIH-T'U, or MO-P'O-ERE-TUEH) was made the commander of the 1st Division, which is the best equipped, trained and commanded in the army, according to WANGLMSHANG (Chinese phoneticization: WANG-LM-SHAM), commander of the 1st Regiment of the First Division. (Shanghai note: See SO-4684 for biographical sketch of MEDELTU.)

Sources for para. 7-8: Chinese, ex-Army Officer from Peiping
travelers from Inner Mongolia January 1947

7. Certain units of the army represent certain Mongolian leagues and banners. (Peiping note: Thus, each unit represents the strength of an individual banner. It is not known whether those units are stationed in the banners or concentrated at a central point. It is believed that the units are stationed in the banners themselves, resembling the Chinese self defense (pao en) or militia (Min ping) units scattered throughout China.)

8. In addition to the above-mentioned units, the former puppet 9th and 10th Armies, the 2nd Division, and the students of the former Hsingan army school (mostly officers) comprise a part of the Eastern Mongolian Army. Army headquarters are in Wangyehmine (122-01,46-05), Lintung (118-58,43-51), Chalantun (122-45,45-01), and Hailar (119-44,49-18). Strength, and identification of the commanding officers is unknown. However, it is reported that the 16th Division Headquarters of the Autonomous Army is in Hailar. There are 6300 well-equipped men with this unit.

Source for para.9: Chinese, ex-Army Officer from Peiping
inhabitants (travelers from Inner Mongolia?)


9. In September 1946, Chinese Communist military instructors began training members of the Eastern Mongolian Self Defense Army in guerrilla warfare. Each guerrilla unit consists of from three to seven persons. By January 1947 these units had been successfully organized.

Source for para. 10: Japanese, Language Instructor Changchun
December 1946

10. Regarding the relationship of the army to the Chinese Communists, WANG-HAI-SHAM said, "If the Eastern Mongolian Self Autonomous Army continues as at present, it is the same as being part of the 8th Route Army. I do not know how to make this army something that will gain the welfare of the Mongolian People. I am the regimental commander but the actual power is being held by the Chinese political members ..."

Source for para. 11: Refugees from Chalantun Changchun
October 1946

11. Every Inner Mongolian soldier wears an insignia on his arm, composed of Mongolian writing and a red star. On their caps is an insignia composed of a blue star, a pick and a whip. The flag of the Inner Mongolian governments both at Hailar and at Chalantun is sketched below:



SUBJECT Political and
Biographical
Leader, Wang

DATE OF INFORMATION: 1

SOURCE Japanese,

1. Wang Hai-shang is the
the Inner Mongolian
4835 about this army
Province. He is a

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was made the commander of the
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sion. (Shanghai note: See

from Peiping
January 1947

Mongolian leagues and banners.
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believed that the units are
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d throughout China.)

former puppet 9th and 10th
the former Hsingan army
the Eastern Mongolian Army.
46-05), Lintung (118-58,43-51),
49-18). Strength, and identi-
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Peiping

instructors began training
Army in guerrilla warfare.
seven persons. By January
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Changchun
December 1946

Chinese Communists, WANG-HAI-
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th Route Army. I do not know
the welfare of the Mongolian
actual power is being held

Changchun
October 1946

on his arm, composed of
s is an insignia composed
the Inner Mongolian govern-
ed below:

SUBJECT Political and Military Information
Biographical Sketch of Inner Mongolian
Leader, Wang Hai-shang

NO 4844

DATE OF INFORMATION: December 1946 except as stated

SOURCE Japanese, Language Instructor

1. Wang Hai-shang is the commander of the 1st Regiment of the 1st Division of the Inner Mongolian People's Self Protection Army. (See Wang's comments in 4835 about this army.) He was born in 1915 in the former East Hsingan Province. He is a Daghors. (See note on Daghors at end of this report.)
2. Little is known about the activities of Wang Haishang immediately before or after the Manchurian Incident, but in 1934 he entered the Hsingan Army Cadet School in the first class, which consisted of sixty students, ten of whom were Daghors. His school record was always good; he never dropped below second or third in his class. He had a very constructive and precise mind and excelled in the study of mathematics. After graduation he was among the five most superior students who were selected to be sent to the Japanese Military Cadet School to study. After returning to Manchuria he became an instructor in the Hsingan Military Academy. Just before the end of the war he became a company commander in the Hsingan 1st Cavalry Regiment. When the Hsingan Army went into Hopei Province to fight the Chinese Communists, he went along as a staff officer.
3. After the war, when the Eastern Mongolian Self Autonomous Army was formed, he became the commander of the 1st Regiment of the 1st Division garrisoned at [?] Gegen Su -- (words indistinct in original text) (112-12,45-55). In June 1946 the army was reorganized and renamed the Inner Mongolian People's Self Protection Army. Medeltu [see 4684] was made the commander of the First Military District (or 1st Division?) and Wang Haishang became commander of the 1st Regiment of the 1st Division.

(Changchun Note: The Daghors are a mixture of the Mongol and Tungus races but their language is more Tungusic than Mongolian. There are now about 100,000 Daghors in Manchuria. Until the last generation most of them lived on the east side of the Hsingan Range. During the past generation they moved to the western side of the Hsingan Range, subjected the [?]Harga (word indistinct in original text) tribes, and became the rulers of Hsingan North Province. (Brkimbato, Chairman of Hsingan Province, represents the influence and interests of the Daghors.) The term "Daghors" is used by the Mongols as a title of contempt, since it comes from the Mongolian word Dagori, which means "subordinates". The Mongols look down on the Daghors because they believe that the Daghors are always on the side of the conqueror, and that their loyalty always runs to the strong side. In the area where the Tungus predominated, the Daghors pledged loyalty to them and called themselves Tungus; when the Mongol races were in power, the Daghors called themselves Mongols; when the Chinese came into power, the Daghors called themselves Chinese and pledged their loyalty to them. As a result they are always active in racial complications in spite of their small numbers and weakness.)

SUBJECT Political Information: History of Inner
Mongolian Republican Temporary Government

NO 4865

DATE OF INFORMATION: Unstated

SOURCE Mongol economist

(Shanghai Note: Because previous reports have mentioned the Inner Mongolian Republican Temporary Government without clearly giving its origin and because there is possibility of confusing the various autonomous movements which sprang up in Inner Mongolia after the end of the war, this report is made with the purpose of clarifying the past and present status of this short-lived movement.)

1. At the time of the collapse of the Japanese armies in Chahar and Silingol League officials and former officials of Prince TE's Meng Chiang Government then at Chahar Secondary Yellow Banner (114-47,42-10), with Buin Dale (Puyinghalai) as their leader, sent messengers to the various banners of Inner Mongolia. Each banner was requested to send delegates to an Inner Mongolia Liberated Areas Meeting. The stated purpose of this meeting was to help the Allies, e.g., Outer Mongolians, Russians, Chinese Communists, Americans and Chinese Nationalists, drive the Japanese from Inner Mongolia. The actual purpose was to change allegiance as quickly as possible and attempt to gain recognition for the Inner Mongolians as an anti-Japanese element in the war. Such action was not considered contradictory to the previous policy of the Inner Mongolians. They had been pro-Japanese only because they were anti-Chinese; the fundamental purpose behind the action of every patriotic Mongol is to achieve Mongolian autonomy in some way. Thus an Inner Mongolian can morally justify any action, regardless of past commitments, provided such action is likely to help Inner Mongolia achieve autonomy.
2. A fair representation of the Chahar and Silingol Leagues' banners was obtained, but not every banner managed to send representatives in time to attend the organization meeting of the "Inner Mongolian Liberated Areas Association," which was accomplished at the Inner Mongolian Areas Meeting. Outer Mongolians and Soviets watched over the entire proceedings at this meeting but were not actual participants.
3. At the insistence of the Outer Mongolians and the Soviets the headquarters of the Association was moved to Sunit Right Banner (112-53,42-40), Prince Te's former residence in Silingol League. (Shanghai Note: See explanatory note at the end of this report of the possible reason for this move.) When the move of Sunit Right Banner was completed, Lamajabu (Corinjabu), vice-president of the Mongolian People's Republic, came to Sunit Right Banner and persuaded the leaders of the Inner Mongolian Liberated Areas Association to go to Dsamiin Uike (111-14,44-30). There Lamajabu stated there was no need for the continuance of the Inner Mongolian Liberated Areas meeting. He clarified his statement by adding that the Soviets, Outer Mongolians and Chinese had already liberated Inner Mongolia, that now was the time for the Inner Mongolians to establish an Inner Mongolian Government. The Inner Mongolian leaders agreed to this and were sent back to Inner Mongolia in about one week.

4. Messengers were again presentatives, and a send representatives established until such 9 September 1945 the inaugurated.
5. The Constitution of was simple and short tailed constitution important principle was to be democratic made in the constit golian government w
6. Soviet and Outer Mo those participating The Mongolian People licly recognize th they did pick the and Outer Mongolia Inner Mongolians th and tactful in the
7. The Inner Mongolia life. The Soviets tions, decided to military commander Sh'a-Chi Headquar by the Chinese Co after the signing sent to Sunit Rig Temporary Governm Banner.
8. At first the Chin a few of the pers ment; Buin-Dale or twenty men we the positions in not looked upon It was asked, "B Inner Mongolians Mongolians?" The Temporary Govern by making it eas Kalgan, the Gov Movement Associ those Mongols w Government were Autonomous Move

4. Messengers were again dispatched to the various banners, calling for representatives, and another meeting was held. Because all banners did not send representatives, it was decided that a "Temporary Government" be established until such time that all the banners could be represented. On 9 September 1945 the Inner Mongolian Republican Temporary Government was inaugurated.
5. The Constitution of the Inner Mongolian Republican Temporary Government was simple and short. If the Government had lasted longer, a more detailed constitution with by-laws, etc., would have been written. The most important principle expressed by the constitution was that the Government was to be democratic and ultimately specialistic in form. No mention was made in the constitution of the relationship to be maintained by the Mongolian government with the government of China and/or other nations.
6. Soviet and Outer Mongolian influence at these meetings was recognized by those participating, although there is nothing in documents to prove this. The Mongolian People's Republic and the USSR did not officially or publicly recognize the Inner Mongolian Republican Temporary Government but they did pick the leaders and gave advice to the leaders. The Soviets and Outer Mongolians were much more judicious in their management of the Inner Mongolians than were the Japanese, but they were much more indirect and tactful in their control.
7. The Inner Mongolian Republican Temporary Government was doomed to a short life. The Soviets and Outer Mongolians, afraid of international complications, decided to step out of the picture. On 10 October 1945 the Russian military commander of the area and NIEH Jung-chen, commander of the Chin-Sh'a-Chi Headquarters, of the Eighth Route Army, signed an agreement whereby the Chinese Communist troops were allowed to enter Inner Mongolia. Soon after the signing of this agreement, troops of the Eighth Route Army were sent to Sunit Right Banner; the leaders of the Inner Mongolian Republican Temporary Government were sent to Kalgan but soon returned to Sunit Right Banner.
8. At first the Chinese Communists stated that they merely wished to change a few of the personnel of the Inner Mongolian Republican Temporary Government; Buin-Dale was relieved of his position. Immediately thereafter ten or twenty men were sent by the Chinese Communists to take over the rest of the positions in the Government. This changing of personnel was, naturally, not looked upon with great favor by the original members of the Government. It was asked, "By what right could men not in the least representing the Inner Mongolians take over a Government purporting to represent the Inner Mongolians?" The Chinese Communists then told the Inner Mongolian Republican Temporary Government that its headquarters was to be moved to Kalgan (thereby making it easier for the Chinese Communists to control it.) Once in Kalgan, the Government was disbanded and the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement Association was established with YUN Tse as its chairman. None of those Mongols who had started the Inner Mongolian Republican Temporary Government were given responsible positions in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement Association.

(Peiping Note: The movement of the Inner Mongolian Liberated Areas Association headquarters to Sunit Right Banner at the insistence of the Outer Mongolians and the Soviets is significant as an example of the Inner Mongolians' susceptibility to "political attraction". Tokyo was replaced by Moscow. It was found necessary to move the meeting place of a political nucleus closer to the USSR.

Previous and also later moves were made for the same reason. During the period of the Japanese dominance in the region, Prince TE and the Japanese carried on a political tug-of-war about the location of the capital of the Meng Chiang Government, the Japanese trying to keep Kalgan as the capital because it was nearest to the center of Japanese influence and Prince TE attempting to maintain the capital in Sunit Right Banner, which was farthest from the center of Japanese influence.

In the fall of 1945 the Western Inner Mongolians moved their capital from Kalgan to Peitzeniao (116-10,43-50) when the Communists captured Kalgan. Subsequently YUN Tse, leader of the Communist-sponsored Inner Mongolian autonomous movement, lost power. (See past and current reports on YUN Tse) In the future the western autonomous movement will probably become less Communist and more Mongolian in policy and ideals, especially if the Nationalist government pays no attention to requests of the Mongol leaders such as ERINCHIN DORJY. (See 3889 for the requests of Mongolian leaders to the Nationalists.) An indication of this tendency away from Communism appeared in October 1946 when YUN Tse asked Jirgalang, who is not a Communist but a former official of Prince TE's government, to become YUN Tse's second in command. (See current report on Jirgalang.)

The shift of the political nucleus of the Eastern Inner Mongolians from Jangyeinmiao to Hailar last summer seems to be almost entirely the result of the political attraction of Inner Mongolians to the Mongolian People's Republic and the USSR. Until the present, the Inner Mongolians of Manchuria have felt that the Outer Mongolians represented two principles: the "racial principle" and communism. The first, the "Mongol race idea", fitted into the Inner Mongolian system of ideology. The second, communism, has not been acceptable. However, to accept Chinese political guidance would also be to accept communism since the Chinese Communists control most of the areas inhabited by the Inner Mongolians and adjacent to the Inner Mongolians. Besides, the Nationalists have done nothing to curry favor with the Mongols. Consequently, the Inner Mongolians have chosen between the "lesser of two evils" by gravitating toward the Mongolian People's Republic and away from China.)

SUBJECT Political
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DATE OF INFORMATION:

SOURCE Mongol, Ec

1. Jirgalang (also pl was one of the le Government. (See was born a common forty-two years o speaks Chinese,)
2. Jirgalang attende went to the Peipi Japan in 1927 to a degree there.
3. In 1931 after th the economic dep 1936 he became t Chiang Governmen
4. After the end of Republican Tempo (Peiping Note: Republic Provis
5. With the dissol in October 1945 as a member of Movement Associ the Communists wished to hold but translate Chinese.
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Inner Mongolian Liberated Areas Association
Insistence of the Outer Mongolians
Example of the Inner Mongolians'

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Inner Mongolian auton-
reports on YUN Tse) In
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Mongols. Consequently, the
"two evils" by gravitating
China.)

SUBJECT Political Information: Biographical Sketch
of Inner Mongolian Leader, Jirgalang

NO 4866

DATE OF INFORMATION: As stated

SOURCE Mongol, Economist

1. Jirgalang (also phoneticized Chargalao; Chinese alias: Te-ku-lai德古来) was one of the leaders of the former Inner Mongolian Republican Temporary Government. (See -4865 on the history of this autonomous movement.) He was born a commoner in Put'eha Banner Pokotu (Puhotu) 121-55,48-407, is forty-two years old, about 5'6" tall and weighs about 140 pounds. He speaks Chinese, Japanese, and Mongolian and reads a little English.
2. Jirgalang attended the Heilungchiang Middle School and after graduation went to the Peiping Shih Ying (钟英) College, from Peiping he went to Japan in 1927 to attend the Nagasaki Commercial College but did not receive a degree there.
3. In 1931 after the Mukden incident he held the position of section chief in the economic department of the Japanese-sponsored Mongolian Government. In 1936 he became the chairman of Prince Te's economic department in the Meng Chiang Government and held that post until the Japanese surrender.
4. After the end of the war Jirgalang became a leader in the Inner Mongolian Republican Temporary Government, sponsored by Outer Mongolia and USSR. (Peiping Note: this has also been known as the Inner Mongolian Independent Republic Provisional Government.)
5. With the dissolving of the Inner Mongolian Republican Temporary Government in October 1945 Jirgalang went to Kalgan and worked under YUN Tse (雲澤) as a member of the Chinese Communist-sponsored Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement Association. However, because he was not a Communist and because the Communists and Mongolians from Kueihua Pumet Banner (111-35, 40-40) wished to hold the responsible positions in the association, he did little but translate books concerning Mongolia from Japanese and Mongolian into Chinese.
6. Before the capture of Kalgan by the Nationalists in October 1945 Jirgalang escaped with YUN Tse to Peitsumiao, where the Communists and YUN Tse requested that he become second in command under YUN Tse, but he refused and made his way back to Kalgan. After an unproductive talk with General FU Tse-yi in Kalgan he went to Peiping and contacted Prince TE. He says that his primary aim in life is the realization of Inner Mongolian autonomy.

DATE OF INFORMATION: December 1946

SOURCE Chinese, civil administrator

1. There are within Nationalist-controlled territory three main groups of Inner Mongolians contending for a position of leadership: the Prince TE group in Peiping, the PAI Yun-ti group in Nanking, and a Sudynan group. In addition, the Mongol nobility group, led by WU Po-lung, has a considerable amount of power. The PAI Yun-ti group and the Sudynan group want to oust Prince TE from his position, but the two groups are also working in secret against each other.
2. Prince TE group: Most of the Prince's followers are now in hiding. One of the most important is Te-ke-hsi-pu-por, who is now under Communist arrest at Peitzumiao. Another is Jirgalang, who recently escaped from Peitzumiao to Peiping. (See 4866) Another important follower is Chao-ke-pa-tu-erh (Chinese name: CHIN Shao-wu 陳紹武) who is now acting Chief-Secretary to Prince TE.
3. PAI Yun-ti group: PAI Yun-ti (白雲禔 chian CHU Chuan 臣) is from Kharchin Center Beamer (118-30,41-30). He joined the revolutionary movement of the Kuomintang at the time of the founding of the Chinese Republic and established liaison with Outer Mongolia, making himself the leaders. In this capacity he attempted to do away with the Mongol nobility, but he failed because the nobles were so firmly entrenched in power. At that time he officially joined the Chinese Kuomintang. PAI is now a member of the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. (Shanghai note: PAI was listed as a "graciously elected" representative to the National Assembly in December.)

PAI is now supporting the policy advocated by the Second Plenary Session of the Kuomintang, namely that the former "Inner Mongolian Self-government Administration Committee" be re-established. However, because of lack of support for his proposals by the people of Inner Mongolia and because of his age and susceptibility to compromise, he is not expected to create much stir on the political beams. Among his followers are: LI Yung-hsin (李永心), also a delegate to the National Assembly, CHIN Tse-li (金作勵), and YU Shao-won (于紹文).

4. Sudynan group: The leader of this group is JUNG Hsiang (榮祥) also known as SAO Chen (- -). He is from Kheihan Tumet Banner (111-35, 40-40). (Shanghai note: He was reported by one source as the delegated to the National Assembly from his banner.) JUNG is an ambitious politician, but he is not generally accepted as a leader by the Mongols as he cannot speak Mongolian and has been greatly influenced by the Chinese. Some of his followers are: Pi Wen-shun (- 文 -), JEN Ping-chun (任 -), CHING Ke-chien (經華 -), KUANG Chi-min (- 濟民), and JUNG Chao (榮超).

(Shanghai note: of these PA, CHING, and JUNG Chao were reported as delegates to the National Assembly, PA and JUNG "specially elected", and CHING as an

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5. WU Ho-ling group: comes from Kharchin and organizer of the Mongolian Kuomintang organized the "Mongolian" (the legal entity of the Government). Most they have a consid

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and JUNG Chao (榮韶).

were reported as delegates
elected", and CHING as an

Outer Mongolian prince.) The Suiyuan group is now collaborating with a
group in Cha-har League in an attempt to oust Prince TE as a leader of In-
ner Mongolia. The Chahar group consists of HU Teng-shen (胡 - 山), CHIA
Feng - chu (曹鳳珠), Ta Winlin, and TAO Frh-chi (道 - 濟). (Shanghai
Note: All of these except HU were delegates to the National Assembly.)

5. WU Ho-ling group: Wu Ho-ling (吳鶴齡), also known as KEI Hsien (梅軒),
comes from Kharchin Right Banner (118-25,41-50). He has been the leader
and organizer of the Mongol nobility in resistance against the Inner Mon-
golian Kuomintang ever since the founding of the Chinese Republic. WU
organized the "Mongolian All-league All-Banner Associated Office" to protect
the legal entity of the leagues and banners and the governmental regulations
promulgated by the organization itself (appreved in the past by the National
Government). Most of his followers are bureaucratic and opportunists, but
they have a considerable amount of power.

SUBJECT Political Information: Ikechou League Banners
and Leaders, Inner Mongolia

NO 4974

DATE OF INFORMATION: February 1947

SOURCE Mongol, anti-Communist

(Washington note: Banners and locations are taken from Mueller's Map of All Mongolia. Readings in brackets are of characters as they appear on a 1:5,000,000 Chinese map dated 1944 and published by the Fu Chang Ya Hsin Ta Msuen She.)

1. Banners in the Ikechou League:

- a. Ordos Left Flank Central Banner (Wang: 109-40,39-35).
(Wong)
- b. Ordos Left Flank Rear Banner (Dalat: 110-00,40-20).
(Ta-la-t'o)
- c. Ordos Left Flank Forward Banner (Dsunghar: 110-40,40-05).
(Chun-ka-erh)
- d. Ordos Right Flank Forward Latest Banner (Dsassak;109-40,39-20)
(Cha-se-k'o)
- e. Ordos Right Flank Rear Banner (Kangghin: 108-10, 39-10)
(Hang-chin)
- f. Ordos Right Flank Central Banner (Otok; 108-10, 39-10).
(O-t'o-k'o)
- g. Ordos Right Flank Forward Banner (Ujin; 109-15, 39-00).
(Wu-shan)

2. Officials of Ikechou League:

a. Chief. "Prince T'u, who is a native of the Ordos Left Flank Central Banner. He is forty-three years old and has a young son and a daughter in school in the banner. Prince T'u is experienced and educated, speaking both Mongolian and Mandarin, and a respected and qualified chief of his banner.

b. Vice-chief: Prince O or Se, who is also the head of the Ordos Right Flank Rear Banner and a native of the Ordos Right Flank Forward Latest Banner. He is forty years old. In 1946 Prince O went to Peiping, and on 24 December of the same year, to Nanking for a conference.

3. Banner heads:

a. Ordos Right Flank Central Banner: Prince Tang, who is fifty years old, speaks Mongolian and Mandarin. He has two young sons studying in the Banner.

b. Ordos Right Flank Forward Banner: CH'EN YU-shan (陳玉山), acting head.

c. Ordos Left Flank Rear Banner: Prince K'ang, who is sixty years old and very conservative. He speaks only Mongolian. He has one son, who leads

the troops in his

d. Ordos Left Flank
He will probably be
popular with the

General Information:

a. There are from

b. General Tu Tsung
they have not yet

Banners

NO 4974

from Mueller's Map of All
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40,39-35).

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Flank Forward Latest
went to Peiping, and on 24
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who is fifty years old,
ons studying in the Ban-

(陳玉山), acting

is sixty years old and
as one son, who leads

the troops in his banner, and two daughters.

d. Ordos Left Flank Forward Banner: Prince Ming, who is thirty years old.
He will probably be replaced soon because he is ill-natured and is un-
popular with the people.

General Information:

a. There are from 3,000 to 5,000 cavalrymen in each banner.

b. General Tu Tso-yi helps the people and is gaining their respect, but
they have not yet submitted to his control.

SUBJECT Political Information: Organization and
Personnel of the Autonomy Government in
Inner Mongolia

NO 5199

DATE OF INFORMATION: December 1946 - March 1947

SOURCE The information in this report was first received in December 1946 from a Chinese Communist underground worker and later in March 1947 from the Intelligence Department of the Kuomintang organization in Inner Mongolia. Neither report gave the date of occurrence.

(Shanghai Note: There are indications that the organization and personnel reported herein may be that of the Inner Mongolian government as it existed in the summer of 1946, and subsequent changes may have taken place. However, since it is the most complete outline of the government set-up that has been received to date, it is reported in full although some of the information duplicates that previously reported. The relationship between the Hsingan Provincial government and the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement Association is not known. There seems to be either a parallel structure in the Chinese Communist administrative set-up, or the two have been combined into one government. Sources do not distinguish between the two governments, and two other sources have reported that the Communists changed the autonomous government name to Hsingan Province when they moved the seat of the autonomous government from Wangyehmiao to Hailar. One source states that because the Mongols did not like the move, a rear echelon government was permitted to remain in Wangyehmiao with a unit of Mongolian cavalry stationed at each city to provide communications if the railroad should become damaged.

Other offices held by the persons in this report have been inserted in parentheses.)

- A. ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE EASTERN AND WESTERN INNER MONGOLIAN UNITED AUTONOMY MOVEMENT ASSOCIATION AT LINTUNG (118-58,43-51). (Shanghai Note: See reporting that the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement Association (which is probably another name for this organization) moved its headquarters* to Hailar and subsequently to Chanluntun (122-45, 48-01) in October 1946.) * [?Eastern headquarters]
1. Chairman: YUN Tse (former chairman of the Chinese Communist-sponsored western autonomy movement with headquarters in Kalgan. See recent reports stating that the leadership of YUN Tse has declined. A Wen Hui Pao article on 15 April 1947 states that he was proceeding to Harbin in connection with Communist appointments of governors in Manchuria.)
 2. Vice-chairman: Buin Mandoho (Po-yen-man-tu) (former Governor-general of Hsingan Province during the Japanese regime, president of the East Mongolian Autonomous People's Republic, which is one name for the organization formed by Inner Mongolian leaders immediately after the war. When the eastern and western movements were combined, Buin Mandoho was made vice-chairman.)
 3. Secretary-general: Temurbagan (T'e-mu-erh-pa-ken) (Minister of Economic Affairs in Hsingan Province during the Japanese regime and also under the East Mongolian People's Republic. According to one source, he became

chairman of the Inner Mongolian Government and its reorganization (bagan 5200).

4. Administration Department (Ma-ni-pa-ta-la) Chinese, head of the department, asked for autonomy and five in Eastern Mongolia report on Manibatar
 5. Military Department Bureau of Hsingan Province, the East Mongolian Chief of the Inner Mongolia Army report on this army
 6. Organization Department Li-keng previous Autonomous Movement
 7. Information Department Education in Hsingan Province, the Board of Public Education, the Education Bureau
 8. Education Department
 9. Finance Department
 10. Women's Department
- B. ORGANIZATION OF THE EASTERN AND WESTERN INNER MONGOLIAN UNITED AUTONOMOUS MOVEMENT ASSOCIATION
1. Chairman: Buin Mandoho
 2. Secretariat:
 - a. Secretary-general (former Chairman of the East Mongolian Autonomous Movement during the war.)
 - b. Secretary (former member of the East Mongolian Autonomous Movement government)
 - c. Filing Division
 - d. Auditing Division
 - e. Meriterious Division
 - f. Accounting

chairman of the Inner Mongolian Self-government Movement Association in its reorganization in May 1946. See current biographical report on Temurbagan 5200).

4. Administration Department (General Affairs Department?): Manibatara (Ma-ni-pa-ta-la) (Secretary-general of Hsingan Province under the Japanese, head of the committee sent to the Chinese Central Government to ask for autonomy at the end of the war, President of the Council of Forty-five in Eastern Mongolian Autonomous Movement. See current biographical report on Manibatara, 5205.)

5. Military Department: Asgan (A-szu-ken) (Director of the Internal Defense Bureau of Hsingan Province during Japanese occupation, same office in the East Mongolian Autonomous People's Republic, later made Commander-in-Chief of the Inner Mongolian People's Self-protection Army. See recent report on this army and current biographical report on Asgan, 5201.)

6. Organization Department: Ko-erh-ken (probably the same person as K'O Li-keng previously reported as a representative of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement Association to Wangyehmiao.)

7. Information Department: Sanjaijap (Sang-chieh-cha-pu) (Director of Education in Hsingan Province during Japanese occupation, Director of the Board of Publicity in the East Mongolian People's Republic, Chairman of the Education Bureau in the Mongolian Self-government Movement Association).

8. Education Department: Ha-shih-pa-t'e-erh

9. Finance Department: Unknown

10. Women's Department: Unknown

B. ORGANIZATION OF THE EASTERN BRANCH OF THE EAST AND WEST INNER MONGOLIA AUTONOMOUS MOVEMENT ASSOCIATION OR EASTERN MONGOLIAN AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENT.

1. Chairman: Buin Mandoho (see above)

2. Secretariat:

a. Secretary-general: Hafengga (Ha-feng-a) (formerly secretary-general of the East Mongolian People's Republic established immediately after the war.)

b. Secretarial Division: E-erh-teng-t'ai (reported by one source as a member of the small Council of Fifteen in the East Mongolian Autonomous Movement Association, by another source as chairman of Na-wen-mu-jen League under the combined eastern and western Mongolian governments.)

c. Filing Division: A-erh-szu-lang

d. Auditing Division: Pai-mu-erh-tu

e. Meriterious Service Record Division: A-szu-la-t'u

f. Accounting Division: Ha-hai-erh

- g. Planning Division: Lu-lu-mu
3. Propaganda Department: Sanjaijap (see above)
4. Supreme Court: Buin Mandoho (see above)
5. Councillor: Namhaijap (Na-mu-hai-cha-pu) (Section chief head of the civil government in the East Mongolian People's Republic. See current report on Namhaijap. 5204.)
6. Civil Affairs Department:
- a. Chairman: Ta-wa-ao-li-erh (former head of Civil Affairs Bureau in the East Mongolian Autonomous Republic and also in the Inner Mongolian Self-government Movement Association.)
- b. Secretary-general: Wen-t'u-su (reported variously as head of Propaganda Department of the Mongolian People's Autonomous Commission.* Secretary of Civil Affairs in the same government, and Director of the Secretariat of the Inner Mongolian Self-government Movement Association.)
- c. People's Affairs Division or Magistracy: Ulitu (Wu-li-tu)
- Administrative Section: Ting-ha-erh-cha-pu (formerly head of the Economic Department in the Mongolian People's Autonomous Commission)*
- Social Welfare Section: Wu-t'a-ha-t'u
- Construction Section: Ku-ta-fu
- Communication Section: Wu-erh-ken-ta-lai (In one report the positions of the last two men were reversed.)
- d. Health Division: Hu-lu-ho (formerly assistant chief of the Propaganda Bureau of the Mongolian People's Autonomous Commission.)*
- Health Protection Section: Se-pu-ke-la-t'u
- Quarantine Section: Ao-se-li
- Hygiene Section: Pai-ta-la
- e. Education Division: Chih-ta-t'u (In one report the position of this man and that of Hu-lu-ho were reversed.)
- Education Section: Fu-li-mo
- Etiquette (?) Section: T'ao-yün-chang
7. Internal Defense Department: Asgan (see above)
- a. Secretary-general: O-erh-pa-la-ko
- b. Military Division: Chin-yung-fu
- Military Affairs Section: Lang-pu-jen-ch'in

*/_Washington Note: The Mongolian People's Autonomy Commission was previously reported to have been organized after the failure of the East Mongolian People's Republic which was hastily established at the end of the war. The Commission was set up to seek autonomy from the Central Government._7

- Military Order
- Legal Section
- Education Sec
- c. Internal Defense
- Internal Defe
- Investigatio
- Quartermaste
- 1st Quarte
- 2nd Quarte
- 3rd Quarte
8. Justice Department
- tion Bureau in H
- Ministry in the
- Representative 1
- Secretary-genera
- Hsingan Province
- Self-government
9. Economic Departm
- a. Economic Div
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- Commercial
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- Property
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- Farm Pro
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- for the represen
- */_See Note on page

Military Orders Section: Wu-erh-ch'uan

Legal Section: Hao-hei-erh-li

Education Section: Fu-li-ch'ing-kuei

c. Internal Defense Division: Pao-ming-te

Internal Defense Section: Pai-ssu-ch'ing-ch'uan

Investigation Section: Li-chen-chiang

Quartermaster Depot

1st Quartermaster Depot: responsible for cereals

2nd Quartermaster Depot: responsible for weapons and ammunition

3rd Quartermaster Depot: responsible for clothing

8. Justice Department: CHANG T'ieh-cheng (formerly Director of Reconstruction Bureau in Hsingan Province under the Japanese, head of the Judicial Ministry in the East Mongolian Autonomous Movement, Chinese Union Representative in the Small Council in the same government.)

Secretary-general: Pa-hsi-men-ts'ang (formerly Secretary of Finance in Hsingan Province under the Japanese, and also in the Inner Mongolian Self-government Movement Association.)

9. Economic Department: Temurbagan (see above)

a. Economic Division: LI Shan-shen (Chinese merchant who was in the Small Council of the East Mongolia Autonomous Movement.)

Monetary Circulation Section: A-erh-szu-liang

Tax Section: T'ien-ling-li

Commercial and Industrial Section: Hei-erh-mu (The positions of the latter two men were reversed in one of the reports.)

Property Section: Chin-mo-yan

Trading Section: Hu-hai-erh-ch'in

b. Industrial Division: Chogbagator (Ch'o-k'u-pa-t'u-erh) (formerly Director of the Production Bureau in Hsingan Province under the Japanese, Commissioner of Production in the Mongolian People's Autonomous Commission.)*

Farm Production Section: Pao-shan-yi

Livestock Section: Pa-shi-men-ts'ang (See above)

Forestry and Mining Section: Meng-ha-pa-t'u

c. CHAIRMEN OF LEAGUES (Peiping Note: It is thought that the League "Chairmen" are actually representatives from the Association to the Leagues instead of being chiefs of the League. The "capitals" may be the bases of operations for the representatives to the League instead of the actual seats of government

*/See Note on page 22/

in the Leagues.)

1. Hsingan League

Chairman: Uindali (Oyondalai or Wu-yun-ta-lai) (formerly Commissioner of Education in the Mongolian People's Autonomous Commission,* Governor of Hsingan Province under the East Mongolian People's Republic, member of the Small Council of, the East Mongolian Autonomous Movement.)

Capital: Wangyehmiao (122-01, 46-05)

2. Nawenmujen League (called Nonni Valley Tribes by Owen Lattimore)

Chairman: A-li-tu-la [See Para. B 2h on E-erh-ting-tai]

Capital: Chalunt'un (122-45, 48-01)

3. Hulunbuir League (or Department)

Chairman: Ta-na-la-ti

Capital: Hailar (119-44, 49-13)

4. Che-li-mu League

Chairman: Sa-ka-la-cha-pu (formerly Director of Civil Affairs in Hsingan Province under the Japanese and in the Mongolian People's Autonomous Commission,* "governor" of Hulunbuir "Province" [? under the East Mongolian People's Republic?])

Capital: Lintung (118-58, 43-51) (Peiping Note: Another source gives the capital as Tungliao (122-58, 43-38). This is probably correct because it is in the territory historically belonging to or associated with this League.)

5. Chao-wu-ta League (or Wu-ta-lai League)

Chairman: Ku-li-mu-na

Capital: Ch'ihfeng (119-00, 42-18)

6. Cho-so-t'u League (or No-so-mu-erh League)

Chairman: T'ao-t'e-ke-ch'i

Capital: Tungliao (122-14, 43-38) (Peiping Note: another source gives the capital as Lintung, which is probably correct since the Nationalists have occupied most of the territory of Cho-so-t'u League.)

* [See Note on page 22]

SUBJECT Political Informa
Leader Temurbagan

DATE OF INFORMATION: Unstat

SOURCE Japanese, Language
stated

[Washington Note: See 519
Mongolian Autonomous Movement]

1. Temurbagan (Chinese phonetic adopted by Jamtsa (Chinese) surrender. Temurbagan's Mongolian Young People's Republic Government. (Shanghai Note: the Eastern and Western Division, Temurbagan is also

2. Temurbagan was born in 1911. His family originally came to graduation from a Chinese to attend the Far East (Shanghai Note: A previous before the Manchurian Invasion of the Inner Mongolian (Manchukuo by the Japanese

3. Temurbagan became chief (?) but lost his position of officials. For a while unit in the Health Department

Source for para 3: Two during the Japanese occupation

4. During the war he became (see 5203 on Hafongga) this he worked in Manila gradually worked up to

5. Following the Japanese member of a negotiating language.

Source for para 5: Two during the Japanese occupation

6. Shortly after the war Party and became its h

* [?Mongolian People's A

SUBJECT Political Information: Inner Mongolian
Leader Temurbagan

NO 5200

DATE OF INFORMATION: Unstated

SOURCE Japanese, Language Instructor with Mongol sympathies except as
stated

[Washington Note: See 5199 on the organization and personnel of the Inner
Mongolian Autonomous Movement Association.]

1. Temurbagan (Chinese phoneticization: Te-mu-erh-pa-ken) is the name
adopted by Jamtsa (Chinese phoneticization: Cha-mu-so) after the Japanese
surrender. Temurbagan's present positions are: leader of the Inner Mon-
golian Young People's Revolutionary Party, and head of Hsingan Provincial
Government. (Shanghai Note: In 5199 on the organization and personnel of
the Eastern and Western Inner Mongolian United Autonomous Movement Associa-
tion, Temurbagan is also reported as the Secretary-General of the Association.)

2. Temurbagan was born in 1903 in Darhan Banner (approximately 122-95,43-56).
His family originally came from Jehol, where his father was a farmer. After
graduation from a Chinese high school in Darhan Banner, he went to the USSR
to attend the Far East Communist University (?Chungshan University).
(Shanghai Note: A previous report called him "Japanese-educated".) A year
before the Manchurian Incident he was sent to Outer Mongolia as the leader
of the Inner Mongolian Communist Party. Following the establishment of
Manchukuo by the Japanese, he worked as a grammar school teacher.

3. Temurbagan became chief of the Education Section in Tung-ke-chung Banner
(?) but lost his position because of a misunderstanding with government
officials. For a while after the war he was also a member of the Cultural
unit in the Health Department.

Source for para 3: Two Japanese officials who worked in Inner Mongolia
during the Japanese occupation of Manchuria.

4. During the war he became associated with Hafongga's (Ha-fong-a) activities
(see 5203 on Hafongga), was arrested, questioned and released. Following
this he worked in Manibatara's Mongolian People's Welfare Council* and
gradually worked up to the position of department head.

5. Following the Japanese surrender he was dispatched to Outer Mongolia as a
member of a negotiating committee because of his knowledge of the Russian
language.

Source for para 5: Two Japanese officials who worked in Inner Mongolia
during the Japanese occupation of Manchuria.

6. Shortly after the war he formed the Mongolian Young People's Revolutionary
Party and became its head. (Shanghai Note: See 5203 in which Hafongga

* [?Mongolian People's Autonomy Commission, see 5199, note on page 22]

is described as the founder of this organization.) He is a close follower of Hafongga, without whom Temurbagan's political future is uncertain. Before the war Temurbagan was unknown; his sudden rise to an influential position has surprised many people. His enthusiasm for Communism and the support he gets from both the Chinese Communists and the Soviets [?] may account for his strength.

SUBJECT Political and Inner Mongol

DATE OF INFORMATION:

SOURCE Japanese, w

(See 5199 on the organ Movement Association.)

Names:

Asgan (Chinese phonetic)

Altaneang (name used)

As Han, Pa-awn-ken, A

LI Yu-tung (李友桐)

Asgan is the Commander of the Eastern Mongol Army and head of the organization he resides. He was born in 1900. He is married to Hafongga's daughter. He is reported as Hafongga's son in his early forties (Washington note: 5199 "Hafongga's daughter the younger.") Asgan graduated from a Chinese Military Academy and was a teacher in a grammar school.

After the Manchurian invasion he joined the Japanese army and became the commander of the Eastern Mongol army and became the commander of the Eastern Mongol army. He was incorporated into the Japanese army as a staff officer at the Military Academy in Manchuria. He is an officer, regional commander, second department ()

Soon after the end of the Eastern Mongol organization of the Manchurian People's Self-Defense Army is in command of 60,000 troops. Reports on this army's strength figures vary from 100,000 to 200,000, probably confused.

Asgan is not considered an eloquent speaker. He is a Japanese Military Officer, Communist, and has a relationship with the Japanese. He is a Communist, but on the other hand he is a Japanese Military Officer.

SUBJECT Political and Military Information:
Inner Mongolian Army Commander in Chief Asgan

NO 5201

DATE OF INFORMATION: Unstated

SOURCE Japanese, with Mongol sympathies

(See 5199 on the organization and personnel of Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement Association.)

Names:

Asgan (Chinese phoneticization: A-sau-kan)

Altaneang (name used before 1940)

As Han, Pa-awn-ken, Asekun (previous spellings of name)

LI Yu-tung (李友桐 Chinese name)

Asgan is the Commander in chief of the Inner Mongolian People's Self Protection Army and head of the military administration cadets' school (in Hailar?) where he resides. He was born in 1910 in Durhan Banner (approximately 122-05,43-56). He is married to Hafongga's daughter. (Shanghai note: she was previously reported as Hafangga's sister, which is more likely, since Hafangga is probably in his early forties. See 5283 on Hafangga.)

(Washington note: 5203 reports that there are two Hafanggas - father and son. "Hafangga's daughter" could therefore be daughter of the elder and sister of the younger.) Asgan's father is a middle class farmer in Barhan Banner. Asgan graduated from a Chinese high school in Muhian, following which he became a teacher in a grammar school in his home town.

After the Manchurian Incident he joined the Inner Mongolian Self-Administration army and became the Propaganda Bureau chief of the headquarters. This army was incorporated into the Hsingun Provincial Policing Army. At this time he was staff officer attached to headquarters. Later he was sent to the Japanese Military Academy in Japan, after graduation accepting successive posts as staff officer, regional commander, and just before the end of the war chief of the second department (intelligence).

Soon after the end of the war Asgma became head of the Internal Defense Section of the Eastern Mongolian Autonomous Movement, and in May 1946 after the re-organization of the government he became Commander-in-chief of the Inner Mongolian People's Self-Protection Army. His headquarters are at Hsilar, where he is in command of 6,000 inner Mongolian troops. (Shanghai note: see recent reports on this army. It is difficult to ascertain the rise of the army because figures vary from 6,000 to 70,000. However, in this case the figure is probably confused, as this source had previously reported the number as 60,000)

Asgan is not considered brilliant, but he has keen political insight and is an eloquent speaker. The fact that he is the only Mongol who has attended the Japanese Military Academy has added greatly to his prestige. Although not an ardent Communist, he must follow Communism to a certain degree because of his relationship with Hafangga. His future activities and loyalties cannot be predicted, but on the whole he will probably go along with Temurbagan and Hafangga.

His present position makes it impossible for him to cooperate in any way with the Chinese Nationalists, but it is possible that he might join the Nationalists if they should give autonomy to Inner Mongolia.

2. The purpose of organizing this new government is not to improve the external (international?) position of the Mongols but to maintain peace and order within the area coming under its jurisdiction. The government also plans to develop industry and natural resources and to consolidate all of their armed forces under a strong command.
3. They are maintaining very close liaison with the Chinese Communists but are not the robots of the communists as they were a year ago. Aside from one Chinese Communist political advisor and one military advisor there are no others directly connected with the government. The Chinese residents in the leagues and banners are controlled by Chinese Communists; where there is overlapping of control, equitable adjustments have been made. The solution to this problem has great propaganda value as it shows that the Chinese Communists are able to get along with minority racial groups, whereas the Kuomintang has failed completely in their attempts to do so. The Chinese Communists have made a definite effort to establish such a relationship. (Shanghai note: the communist radio, in announcing the formation of the government, called it "a Communist-sponsored Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government." The broadcast also said, according to the China Press of 13 May 1947, that "Nyhe in his inaugural speech said that the establishment of the autonomous government is a "preliminary victory" for the Inner Mongolian movement for self government, achieved with the assistance of the Chinese Communists." The Chinese Communist representative CHANG P'ing-hua according to the radio, assured the Inner Mongolians that the communists "firmly espouse the cause of racial autonomy and will help bring about emancipation of the Mongolian race.")
4. There is no official relationship between this autonomous government and the Mongolian People's Republic, but there is actually close liaison. At present the MPR is giving no material aid but is providing political and military guidance. There are also a few MPR field grade officers who are working with the troops of the new government as military affairs liaison personnel. During April 1947 elements of MPR troops advanced as far as Wangyehmiao and Paichangtsu (122-52, 45-37) in vehicles but returned to MPR in a few days. (Shanghai note: there are continual reports of MPR troops in Inner Mongolia. Because of lack of exact information from reliable sources, it is not possible to evaluate these reports. It is possible that the "Outer Mongolian troops" are actually elements of Inner Mongolian troops who are mistaken for MPR troops because of the strangeness of dialect or clothing.) In the political setup there are no MPR men within the direct executive organization, but there are a few in the planning field and a few who work as secretaries or observers at the various government meetings. There are also a few technical men who have come from the MPR to assist the Inner Mongolia in developing their industry and resources. The names of these men are kept secret, they are always referred to by the position they hold rather than by name. Direct liaison is carried on between the MPR and Inner Mongolia in Shichigan Banner (121-00, 46-25), which has always been where Outer and Inner Mongols have met and is commonly called "Secret Door".
5. There is no open relationship between the Inner Mongolian Government and the USSR. Liaison is probably maintained through the MPR.

SUBJECT Political
Communist

DATE OF INFORMATION:

SOURCE Japanese,

(Washington Note: See
Mongolian Autonomous

1. Hafongga (Chinese 哈丰嘎) is secretary of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement. His father, one of the commanders in the 1st Army after the Manchurian invasion, was the senior Hafongga in the Department of Darkhan in the Normal School in Harbin. He worked as the secretary of the Mongolian Independent Movement during this period he assisted in political operations.
2. When the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government broke away from the Manchukuo regime, Hafongga held such positions in the Hsingan Province of Hsingan Province Embassy. At the time of the Mongolian Autonomous Government on the operations.
3. In 1943 while he was in the Manchukuo, Hafongga used to work as agents from Outer Mongolia for the People's Revolutionary Army. He reported by another revolutionary agent but Colonel KANAI was executed. Temujsin continues to work with him.
4. When the Chinese Communist Party took power, Hafongga himself with the Chinese Communist Party at the people's association as head of the secretary-general of the end of 1946 association with the Mongolian in the Eastern

* (Association)

SUBJECT Political Information: Inner Mongolian
Communist Leader Hafongga

NO 5203

DATE OF INFORMATION: Unstated

SOURCE Japanese, Language Instructor with Mongol sympathies

(Washington Note: See 5199 for the organization and personnel of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement Association.)

1. Hafongga (Chinese phoneticization: Ha-fong-a; Chinese name: T'ENG Shu-wan 滕屬文) is secretary-general of the Eastern Branch of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement*. He was born in Darhan Banner (approx. 122-95,43-56). His father, one of the wealthiest farmers in the district, became a brigade commander in the Inner Mongolian Self-Administrative (Autonomous) Army after the Manchurian Incident. When Manchukuo was established by the Japanese the senior Hafongga left the army and became head of the Police Affairs Department of Darhan Banner. The younger Hafongga attended the Mongolian Normal School in Mukden. Then, like his father, he joined the army after the Manchurian Incident. He was an officer in the Student Troops and worked as the secretary of the Commanding General's headquarters. During this period he assisted in the work of military administration plans and in political operations, gaining experience in the field of politics.
2. When the Inner Mongolian Self-Administrative Army was disbanded and the Manchukuo regime began, he became the regional department head of the Hsingan West Province. His rise during the Japanese regime was rapid; he held such positions as: councillor in the General Affairs Section, advisor of Hsingan Provincial Government, councillor in the Japanese Manchukuo Embassy. At the end of the war he became secretary-general of the Eastern Mongolian Autonomous Movement. He helped Manibatara (Ma-ni-pa-ta-la) work on the operational plans of the government and became an important figure.
3. In 1943 while he was Regional Department Chief of the Hsingan Province, Hafongga used radio to carry on secret communications and liaison with agents from Outer Mongolia. At the same time he formed the Mongolian Young People's Revolutionary Party. (Shanghai note: This organization is reported by another source as being Communist-dominated.) Because of his revolutionary activities the Japanese police ordered him to be executed, but Colonel KANAKALA, head of the Langyehmiao Tokumu Kikam, stopped the execution. Temurbagan, now head of the Hsingan Provincial Government, continues to work with Hafongga in his operations with the Outer Mongolians.
4. When the Chinese Communists entered Hsingan Province, Hafongga associated himself with the Communist administration of the district. On 25 May 1946 at the people's rally in Wangychmino Manibatara was forced out of his position as head of the Eastern Mongolian Autonomous Movement and Hafongga (as secretary-general) became the most powerful man in the administration. By the end of 1946 he was holding almost absolute power because of this close association with the Chinese Communists. It is believed by some Mongolians in the Eastern Movement that when the Communists lose power, Hafongga's

* (Association)

power also will decrease. (Shanghai Note: Another source reports that he is the director of the "Tang" which is the Communist "advisory" organization that parallels the Mongolian governmental set-up. He is also reported as a member of the executive committee of the Inner Mongolian Self-Defense Army.)

5. Hafongga has the reputation of being one of the most intelligent of the young Mongolians today. He speaks Japanese, Chinese and Mongolian equally well and understands English. At present his following is not as great as that of Manibatara because of his youth. (Shanghai note: He has been reported as "under forty", in his "early forties", and forty-four.)
6. Hafongga's future in the Inner Mongolian fight for autonomy is questionable because of his apparent Communist leanings. In addition, his health is poor, as he contracted tuberculosis several years ago and has received no treatment to arrest the condition.

SUBJECT Political Inform
Government Office

DATE OF INFORMATION: Unsta

SOURCE Japanese, Langu

1. Namhaijap (Chinese phon Chien-chang 陳健章) Eastern Branch of the called the Hsinger Prov See 5199 on the organ Mongolian Autonomous M Jalaid Banner (approx. high school in Tsitsih
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3. When the war ended an was formed he became when the Communists t post of councillor of Hailar, but is discor nominal position bec alists. Judged by h
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*(Washington Note: The Government and the East Association is not cle separate organizations tions.)

SUBJECT Political Information: Inner Mongolian
Government Official Namhaijap

NO 5204

DATE OF INFORMATION: Unstated

SOURCE Japanese, Language Instructor with Mongol sympathies

1. Namhaijap (Chinese phoneticization: Na-mu-hai-cha-pu; Chinese name: CHEN Chien-chang 陳健章) is the chief of the Councillor Department in the Eastern Branch of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement Association, also called the Hsingan Provincial Government by the Communists.* (Shanghai Note: See 5199 on the organization and personnel of the Eastern and Western Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement Association.) Namhaijap was born in 1903 in Jalaid Banner (approx. 122-20, 46-50). After graduating from the Chinese high school in Tsitsihar, he attended normal school in Peiping.
2. After 1932 he held the following positions: chief of the Education department of the Mongolian Administration Section, councillor of Hsingan Bureau (Provincial Council?) head of the Hsingan Provincial Civil Government Bureau, head of Justo (?Jaoto?) Banner.
3. When the war ended and the Eastern Mongolian Autonomous Movement Government was formed he became a section chief of the Civil Government. In May 1946 when the Communists took over, he was ousted and put in the insignificant post of councillor of the Hsingan Provincial Government*. He is now in Hailar, but is discontented with his job. The Communists gave him this nominal position because they suspected him of communicating with the Nationalists. Judged by his past attitude, he may be doing this.
4. Namhaijap is intelligent, sincere and friendly but is timid and indecisive. When the Nationalists take over, he may be given a position of responsibility.

*(Washington Note: The relationship between the Communist Hsingan Provincial Government and the Eastern Branch of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement Association is not clear. From previous reports it appears that they are separate organizations but that some officials hold positions in both organizations.)

SUBJECT Political Information: Inner Mongolian Leader
Manibatara

NO 5205

DATE OF INFORMATION: Unstated

SOURCE Mongol, confirmed autonomist, except paragraph 6

(See 5199 on organization and personnel of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement Association.)

1. Manibatara (Chinese phoneticization: Ma-ni-pa-ta-la; Chinese name: MA Ming-chou 馬明洲) is a member of the Government Council of the Hsingan Provincial Government (Shanghai note: and Director of the General Affairs Department of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement Association.) He was born in 1899 in Pingtu Banner (?). He is a descendent of Genghis Khan, and his father was an official of the Pingtu government. After graduation from high school in Mukden, he went to a Russian technical law school in Peiping. (Shanghai note: It has been previously reported that he attended the Harbin Law College.) For a short while after graduation he was employed by a steamship company in Harbin. Later he became a station hand of the Tung-ching Railroad, also known as the Chuagtung Railroad.
2. Immediately after the Manchurian Incident he became a central figure in the Inner Mongolian Self-Administration (Autonomous) Movement. When the government of Manchukuo was established, he was appointed chief of the Administrative Department of the Mongolian Administration Bureau, which was the central governing organ in the Mongolian area of Manchuria. Later he was councillor of the Civil Government Department of South Hsingan Province and managing director of the Mongolian People's Welfare Association Foundation.*
*(? Mongolian People's Autonomy Commission)
3. In August 1945 he helped Boiumaudhe in the autonomous movement. When the Eastern Mongolian Autonomous Movement was established in January 1946, Manibatara was established as vice-chairman of the government. After the Chinese Communists occupied Eastern Inner Mongolia and reorganized the government in May 1946, Manibatara's position was taken over by a Communist (CHANG Tse 張策). (Washington note: Manibatara was Director of General Affairs Bureau of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement Association; CHANG has been previously reported as vice-chairman of the Communist Hsingan Provincial Government.) Manibatara was put into the unimportant post of councillor for the Hsingan Government. When the government moved to Hailar on 22 June 1946 he went along with other government officials. Enroute he remarked to a friend, "This is fate. There is nothing to be done about it. Already everything is finished. At least I can smoke some opium and forget about this suffering." Manibatara had taken the cure for opium-smoking but has now started smoking again.
4. Manibatara is a brilliant man, having no equal among the Inner Mongols, with the possible exception of Hafongga. (Shanghai note: See 5203 on Hafongga.) He is broad-minded and generous and has a magnetic personality although he is not good-looking. He has the reputation of being the foremost statesman in Inner Mongolia. Because his chief interest is racial

autonomy, for Inner
Chinese Communists
their race and atta

5. In addition to the accent, speaks Russian (translated?) the movement in Russian. Manibatara was the to the Commission. Manibatara will pro ner Mongolia.

Source for para. 6
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6. In November 1946, has many Chinese f ideas and is not v failure in Februar mission to ask th sequent disputes v prestige. It is unless the Nation

autonomy, for Inner Mongolia, he would be willing to support either the Chinese Communists or the Nationalists if either helped the Mongols preserve their race and attain self-government.

5. In addition to the Mongolian language, Manibatara speaks Chinese with no accent, speaks Russian, and understands English. In January 1946 he wrote (translated?) the proclamation of the Eastern Mongolian Autonomous Movement in Russian. When the Lytten Commission visited Inner Mongolia, Manibatara was the one who formulated the statements made by the Mongols to the Commission. If the Communists withdraw from Inner Mongolia, Manibatara will probably hold a very prominent post in the government of Inner Mongolia.

Source for para. 6; a Japanese official who worked in Inner Mongolia during the Japanese occupation of Manchuria.

6. In November 1946, Manibatara was living in Hailar with his Chinese wife. He has many Chinese friends, is "quietly" anti-Communist, has capitalistic ideas and is not very popular with the present government officials. His failure in February 1946 (Shanghai note: when he tried and failed in his mission to ask the Central Government for Inner Mongolian autonomy) and subsequent disputes with the present officials have cost him much in power and prestige. It is felt that he will never be able to recover (his influence) unless the Nationalists are in complete control of Inner Mongolia.

leader

graph 6

Mongolian Autonomous

la; Chinese name: MA Ming-cil of the Hsingan Provincial General Affairs Department Association.) He was born of Genghis Khan, and his After graduation from ical law school in Peiping. hat he attended the Harbin he was employed by a ation hand of the Tung- ad.

ne a central figure in us) Movement. When the ppointed chief of the Ad- ation Bureau, which was of Manchuria. Later he of South Hsingan Province iffare Association Founda-

us movement. When the ed in January 1946, Mani- rnement. After the Chin- reorganized the govern- ver by a Communist s Director of General vement Association; CHANG e Communist Hsingan e unimportant post of rnement moved to Hailar officials. Enroute he ng to be done about it. e some opium and forget e for opium-smoking

the Inner Mongols, te: See 5203 on magnetic personality on of being the fore- interest is racial

SUBJECT Political Information: Inner Mongolian
Leader Boinmandoho

NO 5206

DATE OF INFORMATION: Unstated

SOURCE Japanese, with Mongol sympathies

[Washington note: See 5199 for report on the Inner Mongolian Autonomous
Movement Association.]

1. Boinmandoho (Chinese phoneticization: Po-yen-man-tu; Chinese name: PAO Pao-ch'en 包森) is the chairman of the Eastern Branch of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement Association. He was born in 1894 in Hsingan Province and is a descendent of Genghis Khan. (Shanghai note: Another source states that he was born a commoner in Khorchin Left Flank Banner (123-20,43-55) and is fifty-five years old.)
2. After graduation from high school in Mukden he became active in the people's self-administration movement. In 1918 he cooperated with the movement by becoming a reporter for a Mongolian newspaper backed by the South Manchurian Railroad. Because of this work, he was carefully watched by the Chinese who considered his thinking "dangerous". Within two or three years, difficulties in management caused the paper to cease publication, and Boinmandoho was without a job. From that time until 18 September 1931 he carried on the people's self-administration movement through underground methods.
3. Because the Kuantung Army in the latter part of 1931 secretly promised to allow self-administration in Inner Mongolia, Boinmandoho joined the Inner Mongolian Army. At Tungliao (122-14,43-38) he headed a suicide squadron that blew up the power plant and narrowly escaped death. Following this incident the Inner Mongolian Self-Administration Army was reorganized and became the Hsingan Province Pacifying Army, with the task of maintaining law and order in the area.
4. In 1932 he became head of the Public Welfare Department of the South Hsingan Province. Succeeding positions were: governor of East Hsingan Province, councillor of the Hsingan Bureau*, governor of South Hsingan Province and governor of General Hsingan Province in 1943. (Shanghai note: He has been previously reported in all these positions.) * [? Provincial Council]
5. In June 1932 the Lytton Commission visited Eastern Inner Mongolia and talked with the leaders. Boinmandoho and Manibatara were among the Inner Mongolian representatives. Since then Boinmandoho has been closely associated with Manibatara without whom Boinmandoho's political power would be weak.
6. After the end of the war Boinmandoho worked with Manibatara in maintaining peace and order in Eastern Mongolia. In January 1946 at Gegen Su-- near Wangyehmiao (122-01,46-05), Boinmandoho was installed as head of the Eastern Mongolian People's Autonomous Government. When the Chinese Communists came into Eastern Mongolia in April 1946, they demanded a governmental reorganization. A rally was held in Wangyehmiao on 25 May 1946, during which the Eastern Mongolian Government was dissolved and the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement Association was formed. Boinmandoho became vice-chairman of this

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organization because YUN Tse, former head of the Communist-sponsored autonomous movement in Kalgan, was appointed chairman. Boinmandoho's position was only nominal; he became a robot of the Communist administration.

- 7. Boinmandoho is the most enthusiastic Buddhist among the present-day leaders in Eastern Mongolia. He is frank and trustworthy but does not possess a brilliant mind. Regardless of hardships, he will tackle anything to bring about his objectives. He has a strong will and is a fighter. He is also an advocate of the "racial principle". (Shanghai note: This is a phrase often used by those who advocate racial autonomy rather than just territorial autonomy.) Since May 1946 he has been carrying out Communist policies because he believes his goal of self-administration by the people may be obtained in this way. He is not a sincere Communist. Most people interested in the autonomy movement for Inner Mongolians feel that Boinmandoho will have an important position if the National Government grants autonomy when the Chinese Communists leave Eastern Mongolia.

Mongolian Autonomous

Chinese name: PAO
Branch of the Inner
born in 1894 in Hsingan
Shanghai note: Another
Left Flank Banner

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SUBJECT Political Information: Relations of the Hsingan
Autonomous Government (Hulunbuir) with other
Political Groups

NO 5208

F-3 5. With the USSR: They
have also established
to buy wool, hide,
change for flour
or not any Soviet

DATE OF INFORMATION: January 1947

SOURCE Young Lama who left Hulunbuir in January 1947

1. The National Chinese flag is still the flag of the Hsingan* Autonomous Government.
2. Chinese Communist officers of the Manchurian Democratic United Army and Chinese Communist political workers have been to Hailar to visit Brkimbato, but there are no Chinese advisors in the Hsingan* Autonomous Government. (Shanghai Note: It has been reported by another source that the commander of the Hsingan (?Hulunbuir) Military Zone is WANG Hong 王洪 and that the Deputy Chairman of Hsingan (?Hulunbuir) Province is SU Lin 蘇霖, a political worker from Yenan. The date given as January may be incorrect, and these may have been the Communist advisors prior to the granting of autonomy to Brkimbato's government in October.) It is believed, though not yet made public, that a treaty was signed between the Hsingan* Autonomous Government and the Chinese Communists, which gave Brkimbato power to manage all affairs pertaining to the Hsingan* Autonomous Government. The Chinese Communists who signed this agreement returned to Harbin in late 1946. In January 1947 the only Chinese Communists in Hulunbuir were those employed at the Chinese Communist financed "Nailar Commercial Company." These Chinese, not numbering more than twenty men, sell and buy goods (ostensibly). However, their actual function is the obtaining of general intelligence and reporting it to the Chinese Communists at Harbin.

*(Washington Note: this government was previously reported as the Hulunbuir Autonomous Government.)
3. Boinmendoho? and Temurbagan went to Hailar in May 1946 to persuade Brkimbato to allow their Association freedom of movement (?) in Hulunbuir. However, Boinmendoho refused to cooperate, and the two men left Hailar in September 1946. (Shanghai note: This incident may be the basis for previous reports of the movement of the Association headquarters to Hailar and further movement to Chalantun after disagreement between Brkimbato and Boinmendoho.) The Eastern and Western Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement Association has a Cooperation Department (Liaison Department) in Hailar. The members of the Department confer with Brkimbato but do not control his actions. Manibatara formerly headed this Department, but he was arrested in November by other members of the Department and was taken in chains to some place south of Hulunbuir area via railroad. Hafongga has not been in Hailar since the Japanese surrender.
4. The Outer Mongolians have requested Brkimbato to visit the Mongolian People's Republic, but he has always refused. (Shanghai Note: It has been previously reported that Brkimbato went to the MPR did make a trip to Hailar to talk with Brkimbato. Brkimbato's successful dealings with the MPR have added greatly to his prestige. He is respected in Hulunbuir because the people realize that their area is one of the few that have peace in Inner Mongolia, and they give Brkimbato the credit.

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with other

NO 5208

January 1947

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visit the Mongolian People's
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F-3 5. With the USSR: The Soviets have a consular office at Manchouli. They have also established a "Hailar Soviet Commercial Company" in Hailar to buy wool, hides, furs, and meat from the Inner Mongolians in exchange for flour and general merchandise. It is not known whether or not any Soviet intelligence workers are in the company.

SUBJECT Political Information: Inner Mongolian
Leader Ulitu

NO 5473

DATE OF INFORMATION: Unstated

SOURCE Japanese, Language Instructor with Mongol sympathies

1. Ulitu (Chinese phoneticization: Wu-li-tu; Chinese name: WU Shou P'eng 烏壽明) is the chief of Jerim (Che-li-mu) League (Shanghai note: also head of the People's Affairs Division of the Civil Affairs Department of the Eastern Mongolian Autonomous Government. See 5199 on this government.) Ulitu was born in 1902 in Pingtu Banner (Khorchin Southeast or Left Flank Forward Banner 122-40,42-40).
2. After the establishment of the Manchukuo government by the Japanese, Ulitu was made chief of the Regional Department of South Hsingan Provincial Offices which handled educational and regional administration (?). Later he became chief of the Hsingan Bureau Investigation Department. He was also the Councillor of the Regional Department of the Affairs of State (?). Then he became the head of Darhan Banner (122-05,43-56) in South Hsingan Province and held this post until the end of the war. When South Hsingan Province became Jerim League again at the end of the war, he was retained as head of the league.
3. Ulitu is intelligent and strong-willed. His will-power was shown recently when he stopped smoking opium at the persuasion of some young Mongols. He was in the habit of smoking with Manibatara whenever he went to Wangyehmiao. He is a better "office man" than a politician, mainly because he is not good in work which requires his coming directly in contact with people and because he gives the impression of being more Chinese than Mongolian. Among some Mongols he is known as a "9-18"* Mongol or fair-weather Mongol. He speaks the Mongolian language poorly and lacks frankness, which is a Mongolian characteristic. It was because of his lack of political feeling that the Japanese put him in charge of the greatest Mongolian Banner (Darhan Banner). Because he does not handle Mongol people well, he is not popular in his present position as head of Jerim League.

*/ Washington note: Reference is probably to 18 September 1931 when the Japanese invaded Manchuria. /

SUBJECT Political Inf
Province Con

DATE OF INFORMATION: F

SOURCE See below

(Peiping Note: See sket
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Source for paragraph 1:

1. Although the chief
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Sources for paragraph

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Sources for paragraph

6. Although he was e
Dorjy obtained an
pected success.

NO 5473

SUBJECT Political Information: Areas in Chahar
Province Controlled by Mongol Leaders

NO 5797

DATE OF INFORMATION: February - March 1947

SOURCE See below

(Peiping Note: See sketch map for clarification of the information in this report. The map was supplied by a non-partisan Mongol. Previous reports and supplementary investigation have verified the information on the map.)

Source for paragraph 1: Associate of Prince TE

1. Although the chief of Usumchin Left Banner [118-55, 45-50, Silingol League] is nominally cooperating with YUN Tse, he is merely playing a waiting game pending the arrival of more arms and ammunition from the Nationalists. Then he expects to launch an offensive (against YUN Tse).

Sources for paragraph 2: Erinchin Dorjy, chief of Shile Buriat Banner
An associate of Prince TE
An anti-Communist Mongol

2. In January Erinchin Dorjy's men made a raid upon Peitzumiao and captured some arms and ammunition (amount unknown). They returned immediately to Shile Buriat Banner. When Erinchin Dorjy returns from Peiping, he is expected to take the offensive (against YUN Tse). Successful offensives by Erinchin Dorjy and the chief of Usumchin Left Banner will result in YUN Tse's forces being driven from Chahar, forcing them to join either Wulji Ochar or Asgan's right wing.

Sources for paragraph 3: An anti-Communist Mongol
Mongol political leader
Mongol economist

3. Since the troops of YUN Tse and Wulji Ochar do not fight each other, the boundary line between their forces is very fluid.

Sources for paragraphs 4 and 5: A non-partisan Mongol and an anti-Communist Mongol.

4. There are very few Chinese (Hans) left in YUN Tse's or Wulji Ochar's territories.

5. FU Tso-yi's forces control only those areas of Northern Chahar Province which have a predominantly Chinese (Han) population except for Habirga (115-31, 42-17) [which is predominantly Mongol].

Sources for paragraph 6: Erinchin Dorjy
An associate of Prince TE
An anti-Communist Mongol

6. Although he was embittered by his failure in Peiping [See -3889], Erinchin Dorjy obtained an interview with General FU Tso-yi which resulted in unexpected success. He obtained the interview through Ma Han-san, then chief

of the 2nd Department of the Ministry of National Defense. (Shanghai Note: Called the Director of Peiping Civil Affairs Bureau by the Chinese press.)

Source for paragraph 7: Erinchin Dorjy

7. Erinchin Dorjy expected to leave Peiping for Dolonnor and Shile Buriat Banner on 4 April 1947, accompanied by a nephew who was educated in Germany, and taking with him the war material collected in Nationalist controlled territory in addition to a jeep and a Japanese truck bought in Peiping. FU Tso-yi, Ma Han-san, and LI Tsung-jen (Director of the President's Peiping Headquarters) told Erinchin Dorjy that they have requested the Ministry of National Defense to supply him with 700 rifles and four jeeps. Erinchin Dorjy expected to be back in Peiping by May 1947 for the rifles.



SUBJECT Political I
Various Mon
and Prince

DATE OF INFORMATION:

SOURCE See Below

Source for paragraph 1

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Sources for paragraph

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(Shanghai Note: In
April FU Tse-yi sai
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that the government
leader, Prince TE,
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Sources for paragraph


3. FU Tse-yi stated i
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Source for paragraph

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Bureau by the Chinese press.)

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tories bought in Peiping. FU Tse-
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1947 for the rifles.



JEHOL

SUBJECT Political Information: Relationship of
Various Mongol Leaders with the Nationalists
and Prince TE

NO 5968

DATE OF INFORMATION: Unstated

SOURCE See Below

Source for paragraph 1: American Observer

1. Prince TE, who suffers from stomach ulcers, has been in poor health. He appears to be in a state of withdrawal and depression except when he is stimulated by food, liquor and friends. His powers of concentration appear to be failing. Although only forty-five years old, he looks as if he were in his middle sixties.

Sources for paragraph 2: Anti-Communist Mongol Mongol lama
Non-partisan Mongol European, anti-Soviet
Mongol political leader

2. The relationship between Prince TE and FU Tse-yi is very unsatisfactory. Ill-feeling and antagonism resulted from a meeting between TE and FU when the latter was in Peiping (in April).

(Peiping Note: After the meeting Prince TE stated, "FU Tse-yi is not to be trusted. He has made many fine promises and says many fine things, but everything he does in regard to Inner Mongolia is harmful to Inner Mongolia, I believe that a good indication of what FU plans to do in the future can be found by analysing what he has done in the past. FU always has been and always will be a 'Hamist'. The only worthwhile man in the Kuomintang is Generalissimo CHIANG Kai-shek; none of these men beneath him can be trusted.")

(Shanghai Note: In an interview with the Associated Press in Peiping on 14 April FU Tse-yi said that Nanking was willing to permit the Mongols to organize banners within the provincial government framework but that an autonomous state was clearly out of the question. According to AP, FU added that the government had no present intention of using the Japanese puppet leader, Prince TE, now in Peiping, whom FU described as suffering from "pangs of conscience" every time he recalled how the Japanese had used him as a pawn.)

Sources for paragraph 3: Non-partisan Mongol
An associate of Prince TE
Anti-Communist Mongol

3. FU Tse-yi stated in the presence of followers of Prince TE that although Prince TE is a good man and probably did a great deal to help the Inner Mongolians, he is still a "ching jih" (清日) or traitor and should not be allowed to occupy again a strong position in Inner Mongolian Affairs.

Source for paragraph 4: Anti-Communist Mongol

4. Prince TE's influence in the former Mongolian area is gradually weakening;

because of his long absence from the area. Only in Prince TE's own banner, Sunit Right Banner (112-53,42-40) do the people really hope for his return. LI Shou-hsin (李守信) and Tan-wu-lung-su-lung (Chinese phoneticization) also called "Chang hu tsu" (long beard), former commanders under TE, still expect TE to gain control of the Chamar and Silingol Leagues. However, because of FU Tse-yi's influence, such a development is improbable. Tu-iu-iu (Chinese phoneticization) and LI Hsiu-hai, followers of Kulji Ochar who are in command of 5,000 Mongol youths, have been negotiating with the Nationalists. (Peiping Note: This number is probably an exaggeration of at least 70%). So far, although some of the men under them have left for Nationalist-held territories, these two men have refused to cooperate with the Nationalists. Tu-lu-lu said in reply to a Nationalist overture that if he should surrender it would be to the Chinese Government and not to the "bandit FU Tse-yi". He said that if Prince TE or LI Shou-hsin were to return to Inner Mongolia he would surrender immediately.

Sources for paragraph 5: Anti-Communist Mongol
An associate of Prince TE

5. A Mongolian Youth Moral Endeavor Association (蒙古青年勵志會) was founded in Kalgan some time in December 1940.

Source for paragraph 6: Anti-Communist Mongol

6. The Mongolian Youth Moral Endeavor Association has been functioning in only a superficial manner. Funds for the organization are supplied by FU Tse-yi. The outgoing director is a Mr. MA who is now the President of a Kalgan Mongolian Normal School. The present director is WANG Chi-shan (王齊善). There are fifty Mongol youths in the Association, but their work is neither coordinated nor regulated. Prince TE has nothing to do with the Association because his life would be in danger if he were to establish connections with the Association and FU Tse-yi should hear of it.

Source for paragraph 7: American Observer

7. Many members of the Association have been recruited from the ranks of Mongol youths who were or are associated with TE. These men have retained their former relationship with TE to a certain degree. They report to TE the happenings in Kalgan, as most of them manage to make a trip to Peiping once every two months. TE has been able to give them orders that have divorced them from any of the activities of FU or the Central Government.

(Peiping Note: As far as is known, TE has not opposed the entry of his men into the Association. He has neither the funds nor the work necessary to keep these youths directly under his wing, but it is believed that he demands and receives loyalty from them, although he does not maintain very close contact with them.)

Source for paragraph 8: Prince TE

8. In discussing the possibility of the Chinese Communists entering Peiping, Prince TE appears quite concerned but remarked, "Perhaps I have nothing of which to be afraid. Perhaps we (the Chinese Communists and TE) can get along."

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9. Dorjisorin, aide-Bolonnor, (114-25 mission was to be to Prince TE's i he plans to move his private secr during this trip why, he replied Kolji Ochar. Th would stop his i decrease the suf said that he wou messenger of Kul this message, he of the message, any further.

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(Peiping Note: Because of the large amount of anti-TE propaganda that has been printed by the Chinese Communists and YUN Tse, such cooperation seems impossible, TE's remark was probably more wishful thinking.)

Source for paragraph 9: Dorjisorin

9. Dorjisorin, aide-de-camp of Prince TE, left Peiping about 1 April to go to Bolonnor, (114-25,42-30) by way of Kalgan. Ostensibly, the purpose of his mission was to buy sheep which would be driven to Peiping and sold to add to Prince TE's income. (TE is now in the process of selling his home and he plans to move to the much more humble residence of Sorindorjy, one of his private secretaries.) Dorjisorin volunteered the information that during this trip to Dolornor his life would be in great danger. When asked why, he replied that he was carrying a secret message from Prince TE to Kulji Ochar. The message stated that Prince TE hoped that Kulji Ochar would stop his individual actions and cooperate with Prince TE in order to decrease the sufferings and political weakening of the Mongols. Dorjisorin said that he would carry the message to Dolonmor where he would meet a messenger of Kulji Ochar. When asked if the Central Government knew of this message, he replied that it did not. When asked to repeat the contents of the message, he carefully repeated his statements, refusing to elaborate any further.

(Washington Note: Dorjisorin may possibly be the same as Dorji-Tsoron, Nationalist appointed chief of Sunit Right Banner. Sorindorjy may possibly be the same as Solendorji, Nationalist appointed chief of Usumchin Right Banner.)

(Peiping Note: Prince TE probably did not tell the complete contents of the message to Dorjisorin. The message might be an attempt by TE to win Kulji Ochar over to the side of the Nationalists. However, if this is true it would seem that the Nationalists would be told of the existence of the note. It seems more probable that the note is an attempt on TE's part to strengthen his position in Inner Mongolia without the help of the Central Government. It must be remembered that TE attempted to establish liaison with troops of the Mongolian People's Republic but failed. Because of the anti-TE propaganda in the MPH and the failure to establish liaison, TE assumed that he would not be allowed to cooperate with the MPR and might even be executed by the Outer Mongolians. It was only after reaching this conclusion that TE, with his staff and such units of the Mengchiang Army that he could still command, retreated to Peiping, where he offered his services to the Central Government. Thus it can be said that the Central Government as far as TE is concerned, has played "second fiddle" to the MPR and his alleged connection with the MPR in addition to his loyalty to TE, might be the bridge by which TE can desert the Central Government and establish relations with forces of the MPR. Jirgaleng might also be used as a bridge by which TE could switch sides. Such a switch would probably not cause the slightest twinge of conscience in TE because he can rationalize it as a service to the people of Inner Mongolia.)

(Washington Note: See 4866 for previous report on Jirgalang.)

Source for paragraph 10: Relative of Jirgalang

10. Jirgalang, who is considered one of TE's followers, is very eager to cooperate with the United States or the USSR. He gave his relative the impression that either American or Soviet intervention in Inner Mongolian politics would be equally welcomed.

Source for paragraph 11: Prince TE

11. When asked about Erinchin Dorjy, Prince TE replied that Erinchin Dorjy assumes the privileges of a prince but that he is not even of noble birth. Prince TE has no use for Erinchin Dorjy.

(Peiping Note: This denial of Erinchin Dorjy's noble birth contradicts statements made by all other sources. TE's remark is probably indicative of his jealousy of and hatred for Erinchin Dorjy rather than being a true statement.)

Source for paragraph 12: Non-partisan Mongol

12. Since Erinchin Dorjy's success in Kalgan, many of TE's associates have said that Erinchin Dorjy is selling Inner Mongolian independence for too cheap a price.

Source for paragraph 13: Mongol lama

13. Erinchin Dorjy has been buying small arms and ammunition in Peiping. Many people do not trust him and believe him to be an agent of the USSR.

Source for paragraph 14: European, anti-Soviet

14. Because some of the Buriat Mongols residing in Inner Mongolia have either become too friendly with the Soviets or have worked too wholeheartedly with the Chinese Communists during the last two years, many of the Inner Mongolians have begun to distrust the Buriats living in their midst. However, although Erinchin Dorjy tends to be all things to all men, it is not believed that he could be working for the USSR.

Source for paragraph 15: Erinchin Dorjy

15. "The Mongolian people are tired of being ruled by the same men. (Peiping note: This refers to Prince TE and his associates.) These men were in control of Inner Mongolia before the arrival of the Japanese and during the Japanese occupation; some have even cooperated with the Chinese Communists; and now these men are attempting to rule the people again.... The present Mongolian leaders in Manchuria, such as Erkimbato, Buinmandaho, Asgan, and Manibatara, are all puppets and should be removed from their present positions. I, during the entire period of the Japanese occupation, minded my own business and jealously guarded the resources of my people. Now the time has come for the people of Inner Mongolia to follow the new leader. (Peiping note: This means Erinchin Dorjy himself.) The Inner Mongolians are tired of the various 'isms' which have attempted to penetrate our land. The Communists, the Kuomintang men, the Soviets, the Outer Mongolians, and

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the Japanese have all attempted to rule in Inner Mongolia. We are tired of such nonsense and wish to return to our traditional way of life. The youth must taught the old manners, and the traditional customs must be protected. The best thing that could happen in Inner Mongolia would be for Janja Gogen, the Living Buddha who is now in Chengtu (Szechuan), or better still the Panchan Lama to come to Inner Mongolia to assist in the regeneration of the Mongol traditional way of life. However, since the Nationalists are afraid to allow Janja Gogen into Inner Mongolia, my desire will probably not be fulfilled."

(Shanghai Note: It has been previously reported that the Panonan Lama's "secretary-general", Baldin-Jamso, made an attempt in the latter part of the summer of 1946 to visit Erinchin Dorjy. Ostensibly his purpose was to buy ritual utensils and decorations but he carried the Panchan Lama's seal and documents.)

(Peiping Note: What would happen if Erinchin Dorjy should gain control of Western Inner Mongolia is rather difficult to predict, since, although he is anti-Communist, he is also anti-Nationalist; he is, in fact, anti-Chinese. Possibly he has had to appear extremely anti-Soviet, and opposed to the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement Association in order to receive aid from the Nationalists. He has also had to appear anti-TE in order to receive aid from FU Tse-yi. Since Erinchin Dorjy is proud of the fact that he does not understand Chinese, it seems impossible that he can continue to cooperate with the Chinese for any length of time. However, it would be a very incomplete analysis to consider him a mere opportunist. His real intentions and feelings cannot be judged at this time.)

Source for paragraph 16: American Observer

16. Ganjurma Mutukhtu, the Living Buddha from Dolonner, has decided that it is impossible to work with the Chinese Nationalists except directly with the Generalissimo. He has been trying to meet the Generalissimo. In spite of this belief, however, he planned to go to Kalgan to visit FU Tse-yi in April.

Source for paragraph 17: Anti-Communist Mongol

17. Belogetu, a native of Jehol, was LI Shou-hein's adjutant during the period of the Menchiang Government. During that time he established a good reputation, which has lasted to the present. When Belogetu arrived in Kalgan, FU Tse-yi intended to appoint him as Commander-in-Chief of the "Banner Self-Defense Corps" in Nationalist-controlled Inner Mongolian territory. However, because only a few of the banners have been completely taken over by the Nationalists this appointment has been pigeonholed. Belogetu now has the rank of colonel and he is to lead 300 men as an advance commander of the "bandit annihilating army".

Source for paragraph 18: Non-partisan Mongol

18. At the end of February Belogetu had not yet left Kalgan. Many Inner Mongolians despise him because they believe he is the "running dog" of FU Tse-yi.

Source for paragraphs 19, 20 and 21: Anti-Communist Mongol

19. Prince A (阿) of Suiyuan, aged sixty-one, is an hereditary prince of the Ikechou League. During the period of the Mengchiang Government he was the director-general of the Ikechou League. He has a Mongol wife and a Japanese wife. A twelve year old son, by his Mongol wife, is living in Prince A's home in Peiping where he is studying. CHIN Pao-shang, former personal adjutant of Prince A, is in charge of this house. Prince A reads and writes both Chinese and Mongolian and also speaks and understands a little Japanese. The Mongol inhabitants of Ikechou League think very highly of Prince A.
20. The relationship between Prince A and Prince TE has never been either very good or very bad. Since the surrender of the Japanese, the two princes have had few occasions to meet or correspond, and it is believed that they now have even less association with each other. On the other hand, although the former relationship between Prince A and the Central Government was poor, Prince A is now cooperating with FU Tse-yi.
21. Prince SA (薩) or O, also an hereditary prince of Ikechou League, is somewhat under the domination of Prince A, although the relationship is not clear. Prince SA is fifty-two years of age, has two wives but no children. One of his wives is now in Peiping. He cannot read Chinese and speaks only a little Mandarin. Because he must rely upon his secretary, who is very intelligent, the secretary is more important than would normally be assumed. Prince SA maintains a good relationship with the Nationalists.

Source for paragraph 22: Non-partisan Mongol

22. FU Tse-yi has recently done away with the banner governments in Ikechou League and has instituted district (hsian) governments in their place. This action has been bitterly resented by the Mongols.

Source for paragraph 23: Anti-Communist Mongol

23. WU Ho-ling, aged fifty-nine, a native of Manchuria, is the Mongol appointed by the Central Government to be the Kuomintang Leader of the "comfort team" for Silingol League. With his two wives, one a Mongol and the other a Japanese, he lives in Peiping. He speaks Mongolian, Japanese, and Chinese fluently. He is second to none in ability, even Prince TE. He is very ambitious and hates Prince TE, when the Japanese surrendered, he plotted and is still plotting, to control TE but has failed so far. He maintains some sort of connection with LI Shou-hsin.

(Washington Note: See 4973, paragraph 5 for previous report on WU Ho-ling.)

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SUBJECT Political Information: Biographical Sketch
of Hasbagator of Inner Mongolia

NO 6436

DATE OF INFORMATION: Unstated

SOURCE Source for paragraph 1-4: An acquaintance of Hasbagator for 13 years

1. Hasbagator (Chinese phoneticization: Ha-ssu-pa-te-erh; Chinese name: Pai Yun-hang 白雲航) was born in 1906 in Khorchin Banner in Johol Province. He is the younger brother of the prominent Kuomintang Mongol PAI Yun-ti (白雲梯) with whom he disagrees politically. In his younger days Hasbagator was under General FENG Yu-heiang. When FENG held the power in northwest China, he was very friendly with the Russians and worked for the "communization" of Inner Mongolia. (Shanghai Note: This may have been in 1925 when he was the defense commissioner of Kansu Province.) At that time superior youths in FENG's forces were selected for study in the USSR, and Hasbagator was included in this group. After four years of study at the Red Army Cavalry School in Kiev, he returned and worked on the Inner Mongolian autonomy problem. Following the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident he became an organizing (staff?) officer of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Army and afterward the commander of the Student Corps, which was built around the students in the Nukden Mongolian Normal School.
 2. Later he became a regimental commander, and following the establishment of the Hsingan Army under the Japanese he became a staff officer (lieutenant) under Machinchonghor, commanding officer of the 2nd Regiment. At this time he became very ill with tuberculosis, and although the disease was arrested he is still in poor health. After being promoted to the rank of major he was chosen as one of four Mongols to go to the Japanese Military University. The others were Asgan, Ukoting, and Jongjorjap. In preparation for this course he studied at the Mukden Army Training School for a year but failed to pass the examinations which would have entitled him to go to Japan. This failure may have been caused by his poor Japanese and by the unfavorable impression he creates socially.
 3. After this course he was made an instructor at the Military Academy (in Manchuria) and was promoted to the rank of colonel. Later he became the commander of the South Hsingan Cavalry Regiment but resigned in 1944 to accept the position of Business Section head of the Mongolian People's Welfare Association under Manibatara. There he remained until the end of the war.
 4. After the surrender of Japan, when the Eastern Mongolian Autonomous Army was formed, Hasbagator became a divisional commander. It is not known what happened to him when this army was disbanded and the Inner Mongolian People's Self Protection Army took its place. Unconfirmed rumors that he committed suicide are probably false. Because of his dependence on Manibatara his political career would probably fluctuate with Manibatara's.
- Source for paragraph 5: Unstated
5. Hasbagator is the head of Josoto League and concurrently a divisional commander in the Eastern Mongolian People's Self Protection Army.

(Shanghai Note: It has been recently reported that Ha-ssu-pa-te-erh is the commanding officer of the 1st Division of the "Eastern Mongolian Autonomous Government Army". Chinese government sources continue to designate the Mongolian army by this term. This may be correct. On the other hand, there have been reports of a reorganization of this army in June 1946 in which the name was changed to the "Inner Mongolian People's Self Protection Army".)

[Washington Note: See 4684, 4835 and 4844 on the Inner Mongolian People's Self Protection Army. Medeltu has been reported as the commanding officer of the 1st Division as well as the commanding officer of the 1st Military District. Also see 5199, page 2 [page 21], reporting that Ha-shih-pa-te-erh (probably the same as Ha-ssu-pa-te-erh), to be head of the Education Department of the Executive Committee of the Eastern and Western Inner Mongolian Autonomy Movement Association.]

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SUBJECT Political Information: Reorganization of
Autonomous Government in Inner Mongolia

NO 6629

DATE OF INFORMATION: 9 June 1947

SOURCE Chinese sent by Hafongga to Changchun to establish liaison with
Mongols and Chinese now in Nationalist-held territory.

1. On 1 March 1947 an Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government was set up at Wang-yehmiao. (Shanghai Note: The former Communist Yen-an radio on 12 May announced the date as 2 May after the formation of a Provisional Council on 23 April.) The personnel of the reorganized government is as follows: (Supplementary information from previous reports and from the radio broadcast is in parentheses.)

President: YUN Tse (formerly head of the Communist-sponsored autonomous movement with headquarters in Kalgan. Later head of the combined eastern and western movements. See previous reports on YUN Tse and these various governments.) He is concurrently head of the National Assembly or "Big Council" (Baga Horaldan).

Communist Political Advisor: CHANG P'ing-hua (張平化).

Vice-president: Hafongga (This was pronounced Pasanga in the radio broadcast. See previous reports on this Mongolian leader.) He is also head of the Central Executive Council or "Small Council" (Yike Horaldan).

Commander in Chief: Asgan (He has held this position in all reorganizations from the time of the Japanese-sponsored Hsingan Provincial Government. (See previous reports on the Inner Mongolian Army and biographical sketch.)

Communist Military Advisor: LU Cheng-Ts'ao (呂正操)

Chief of Staff: Chang Nima (head of Internal Defense organizations in Japanese-sponsored Hsingan Provincial Government and two subsequent Inner Mongolian set-ups.)

Vice Chiefs of Staff: Chen Chogto (Ch'en-ch'ao-ke-t'u)
Nomonto (No-men-t'u)

Northern Military District Headquarters: KUO Wen-t'ung (郭文通)

Western Military District Headquarters: Hasbagator (see recent biographical report).

Central Military District Headquarters: Nachinchonghor (former commander of the 2nd Division of the Eastern Mongolian Autonomous Army. See previous biographical sketch.)

Eastern Military Headquarters: not known. (Changchun Note: There are reports that Medeltu is the officer in charge. See previous biographical sketch.)

Economic Section: Temurbagan (reported in similar positions from the time of the Japanese-sponsored Hsingan Provincial government. See previous biographical sketch.)

Civil Government Section: not known

Industrial Section: Ponseg (P'ang-ch'u-ke) (this position filled by Chogbator in most previous set-ups.)

Construction Section: Hebte (Ho-pu-tai)

Education Section: Sanjaijap (reported in similar positions in all the various government set-ups from the time of the Japanese-sponsored Hsingan Provincial Government. See previous biographical sketch.)

Internal Defense Section: YÜN Tse (nominally only)

Military Affairs Section: Asgan

Judicial Section: CHANG Tieh-cheng (張鐵錚) (head of "Reconstruction Bureau" in the Japanese-sponsored Hsingan Provincial Government and immediately after the surrender, then in the Judiciary Section, later in the Industry Bureau.)

Economic Expert Council: Pashimensang (Pa-shi-men-ts'ang) (previously Secretary of Economic Affairs in the "East Mongolian People's Republic".)

Planning Council: not known

League Governments: (As previously reported, the persons so listed may be representatives to the leagues rather than chairmen of the leagues.)

Ikechou League: not known

Ulanchan League: not known

Chahar League: not known

Silingol League: not known

Josoto(Cho-so-t'u) League: Hasbagator

Jaoda (Chao-wu-ta) League: Tsagarjap (Sa-k'a-la-cha-p'u) (previously reported as head of the Civil Affairs Bureau in the Japanese-sponsored Hsingan Provincial Government, "governor of Hulunbuir Province").

Jerim (Che-li-mu) League: Ulitu (see recent biographical report)

Hsingan League: not known. (This is probably Hulunbuir, which has refused to cooperate with the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government. See current report.)

Nawanmujen League: not known

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SUBJECT Military Information: Biographical Sketch of
Inner Mongolian Leader Dogorjap

NO 6991

DATE OF INFORMATION: 28 June 1947

SOURCE Japanese, with Mongol sympathies

1. Dogorjap; (Chinese phoneticization: Tu-ku-erh-cha-pu) is the commander of a guerrilla brigade of the Inner Mongolian People's Self Protection Army. He and Chang Nima are the leaders of the Mongolian Military Clique and are the two men most trusted by Asgan, Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

(Changchun Note: The Military Clique is one of several cliques and factions which exist among the Inner Mongolians.)

[Washington Note: See -6629 reporting Chang Nima to be the Chief-of-Staff of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government Army.]

2. Dogorjap, aged thirty-one, was born in Khorchin Left Flank Center Banner, [also known as Darhan Banner, 123-20, 43-55]. He comes from a middle class farmer's family and did not receive a formal education during his adolescent years. Instead he joined the Youth Corps which was established in connection with the Hsingan Police Force. In this group were approximately 300 youths between the ages of thirteen and sixteen. The purpose of the training was to give the youths military education. Dogorjap displayed outstanding ability while in the Youth Corps.

3. At the age of eighteen he entered the first class of the Hsingan Military Cadet School. While in the Cadet School he never ranked lower than third in his class and usually ranked first, above both Chang Nima and Wang Hai Shang. Following graduation from the Cadet School, he was sent to military school in Japan, where his achievements were outstanding. After graduation he returned to eastern Inner Mongolia to become a section commander of students in the Hsingan Military Cadet School.

[Washington Note: See -4844 for a previous report on Wang Hai Shang.]

4. After he was promoted to the grade of lieutenant he was again sent to Japan to attend the Cavalry Cadet School in Chiba Prefecture. As an officer student he studied cavalry military tactics for a year and then returned to Manchuria where he worked in the training department of the Military Affairs Section in Changchun. About two or three years before the Japanese surrender Dogorjap was an instructor in the Hsingan Military Cadet School. Because of poor health he was never able to assume an active military command.

SUBJECT Military Information: Liaison by Inner Mongolians
with USSR, Mongolian People's Republic and the
Chinese Communists

NO 6995

DATE OF INFORMATION: See Below

SOURCE Source for para. 1: An Inner Mongolian Military Leader
Date of Information: 28 June 1947

On 7 April 1947 representatives of the USSR, Chinese Communists, Mongolian People's Republic and Eastern Inner Mongolia assembled at Wangyehmiao to discuss future coordination of military operations. Participants at the meeting were a Soviet Major Shchamikov, Chinese Communist DHANG Lin-ko (張林閣), Major Sereng from the Mongolian People's Republic, Asgen, Commander in chief of the Inner Mongolian People's Self Protection Army, and Hafongga, vice-chairman of the recently reorganized Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government. A representative from the Hulunbuir Autonomous Government attended as an observer. Future cooperation among the various groups represented was discussed. The Soviet delegate stated that there might be an international change in the near future, at which time they would all "spread and coordinate the battle line". He said that at that time the USSR would give full assistance and would cooperate with relief of mind;"

(Shanghai Note: A fairly reliable source recently reported that the Chinese Communists have concluded a military agreement with the Mongolian People's Republic.)

Source for paragraph 2: Chinese who recently returned from Heilar
Date of Information: 16 June 1947

Every month a Buriat Mongol Major named Senjejap (Chinese phoneticization: San-chieh-cha-pa) goes to Manchouli, Hailar, and Chalantun to meet the influential Mongols of those regions. Sanjejap was in Changchun with the Soviet army until April 1946 when they withdrew. While there he carried on liaison with the Mongols in Changchun-wh) came originally from the area of Eastern Inner Mongolia.

(Washington Note: Senjejap is probably the same as Sanjaijap, Chief of the Propaganda Department of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government. Also see 6629 reported Sanjaijap to be head of the Education Section of the reorganized Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government at Wangyehmiao.)

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SUBJECT Political Information: Activities of Wulji
Ochar in Inner Mongolia

DATE OF INFORMATION: June 1947

SOURCE See below

Source for paragraphs 1-8, Former official of the Chinese Communist-sponsored Inner Mongolian Autonomy Movement Association who recently arrived in Peiping from Chahar.

Mongols in Peiping are stressing the significance of a recent split within the ranks of the Manchurian Inner Mongolians. On one side are the older, more conservative men such as Zeirmandaho, who favors the cooperation of the Inner Mongolians within the future Federal Union of the Chinese Communists. On the other side are the younger men led by Angan, who would ward a union now with the Mongolian People's Republic. They reason that if the Inner Mongolians must be Communists, they might as well become a part of a Mongolian republic rather than continue obnoxious ties with the Chinese.

Wulji Ochar, who controls much of the area in Chahar, has been reported to have good liaison with Angan. Because of this connection it is expected that he will increase his control over the Mongolian areas as a representative of the clique favoring a merger of Inner Mongolia with the Mongolian People's Republic.

In March 1946 Wulji Ochar's cadre returned (from the Mongolian People's Republic) to the areas of the Chahar and Silingol Leagues and organized local peace preservation units independently of the Chinese Communists. Their work in the beginning was slow. Wulji Ochar's assertion that he had USSR support appealed to some Inner Mongolians but the lack of evidence tended to frighten away recruits. Many Inner Mongolians believed that he was only boasting and had not actually obtained Soviet backing.

(Washington Note: See 5797 for report on Wulji Ochar.)

It was not until July 1946 that Wulji Ochar became a prominent figure in Inner Mongolian affairs in the Mangchiang area. The reason for his gain in popularity and support was the discovery, by Mongol officials of Chahar League, of a secret memorandum from the Chinese Communist-sponsored Chahar Provincial Government to their trusted officials in the Chinese Communist-sponsored Inner Mongolian Autonomy Movement Association. This document was covertly read, replaced and the contents spread by word of mouth.

Autonomy of the document is as follows:

Use was of their peculiar economic structure, Mongols have not developed close relations similar to those in the rest of China. In order to insure the (Chinese Communist) ultimate mastery over the Inner Mongolians we must promote, a close cleavage in the population. The upper classes are our natural enemies, the lower classes will follow anyone. Our job is to assure control of the lower classes. This must be done by working first with the intellectuals. We shall use them as we would use boards to cross a stream and discard them in the same point. Of course we shall allow some youths, after close examination to follow us. We must also make use of the upper class (princes?). At the

same time we must make use of propaganda to show that all the woes of Inner Mongolians are the result of the Japanese, the Mongol nobility and the "harmists". We must convince the people that their revelation lies in a Communist-dominated China.

(Peiping Note: The policy of the Chinese Communists, as described to an American observer by a member of the Inner Mongolian Autonomy Movement Association, is very similar to that set forth in this document.)

Upon the discovery of this document, Inner Mongolian leaders, youths, and soldiers began to leave the Communist fold and seek sanctuary in territory controlled by Wulji Ochar.

At first Wulji Ochar did little to consolidate his control over the peace preservation units under his command and allowed them freedom of action. As a result, the peace preservation commanders could be counted upon to fight Nationalist troops only if the Nationalist troops entered areas inhabited by Mongols. After the fall of Kalgan Wulji Ochar promised to cooperate with the Chinese Communists. He adapted a policy of appointing banner chiefs or peace preservation commanders loyal to himself in each of the banners under his control. In his extension of control, he often carried out his policies by assassination and suppression (? of Mongols opposed to cooperation with the Chinese Communists.) Wulji Ochar also has a good background in political training; he is a graduate of Moscow's Oriental University.

(Shanghai Note: There have been reports in the Chinese press of the kidnapping and assassination of Mongol princes in Suiyuan and Chahar Provinces. Among them have been Ahat'eng-so'i-erh (reported "Chi-fa-wu-to-tze") of Urat Rear Banner, and his mother, Queen Ch'i-chun-feng, a number of princes in the Silingol league, as Cha-sa-k'e-tu-ke-erh, chief of Sunit Right Banner, and Namutche, leader of the Peace Preservation Corps of the left Sunit Banner. The Queen was reported as having pro-PU Rso-yi sympathies.)

Because of Wulji Ochar's methods, some of the Mongols left his areas and asserted to the Nationalists. Most recent of these deserters was Fu-li-ah, who had been peace preservation commander of Chahar Secondary Yellow Banner (114-47, 46-10).

Source for para. 9, Mongol, anti-Communist.

Wulji Ochar is now only biding his time. If at all possible he will remain independent of the Communists. However, as a last resort he can be expected to operate even more closely with them.

Shanghai Note: In an article on the new organization of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government which took place in the spring of 1947, the TA KUNG PAO reported that "Wutaongaochierh, commanding officer of the Communist Forces in the Northern Chahar area, was named as a commissioner". Reference is probably to Wulji Ochar.)

Source for para. 10, unstated.

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Wulji Ochar's troops invaded Shile Buriat Banner and dispersed those troops loyal to Krinchin Berjy. This defeat of Brinchin Berjy's troops may have been the new result of the Nationalists issuing defective weapons to Brinchin Dorjy and his refusal of return to the area north of Delon Nor (Tolun, 116-25, 42-10) as planned troops of Wulji Ochar have also recently attacked (?FU Tso-yi's troops) just north of Changpoi (114-50, 41-06).)

SUBJECT Political Information: Mongolian Youths Alliance in Inner Mongolia

NO 8901

DATE OF INFORMATION: 7 September 1947

SOURCE Japanese language instructor with Mongol sympathies

1. A "Mongolian Youths Alliance" was formed in October 1946, following the adjournment of the National Assembly at Nanking by Inner Mongolian Representatives to the Assembly who were despondent because of the rejection of their proposals for autonomy. They agreed that the Alliance should remain underground until it gained sufficient strength to come into the open as a political party. The person who was most active in the establishment of the group in Nanking was Ergungo who is still in Nanking as a member of the Mongolia-Tibet Council.

[Washington Note: The National Assembly adjourned in December 1946.]

2. There are now branches in Communist-controlled Inner Mongolia and branches are being set up in China proper in cities such as Peiping, Mukden and Changchun. All meetings are held in secrecy. An Alliance Council meeting has not yet been held.

3. Some of the more significant aspects of the Alliance as set forth in its constitution can be summarized as follows:

- a. Purpose: To unite all Mongols in order to gain freedom and equality with other races in the world.
- b. Governing bodies: (1) Alliance Conference (General Assembly) to meet once a year or when called for emergency meetings by the General Affairs Council. (2) General Affairs Council (Executive Committee) composed of seven to nine persons elected yearly. Under this Council are various committees to handle the work of the Alliance, such as the "Investigation Group", the "Propaganda Group" and the "Planning Group."
- c. Membership: Any Mongol who agrees to abide by the aims of the Alliance and work for them and is guaranteed by two members of the Alliance, is eligible for membership. The General Affairs Council passes on the recommendations for membership made by the members.

SUBJECT Politic
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1. In November 1946 was formed in Inner Mongolia (phoneticized Chih-ta-t'e). The movement spreading its influence eventually came to the People's Self Defense Army. The Party were the Slogans of the Party were the people by the National Government. neutral attitude

(Washington Note)

2. Trouble beset the Party who claimed to be a vice-commander. Both of these were the political position to keep the party, including where they are of the 5 Divisions. "Fifth Offense" closely watched. accorded the

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(Washington Note mentioned above)

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NO 8901

SUBJECT Political Information: Chinese Communist Suppression
of Inner Mongolian Secret Political Organization
("Righteous Party")

NO 10403

DATE OF INFORMATION: 2 September 1947

SOURCE Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang) representative who was sent to Chalentum (132-45, 48-01) to establish liaison with subject group.

1. In November 1946 a secret Mongol organization called the "Righteous Party" was formed in the vicinity of Chalentum. The leaders were Achingga (Chinese phoneticization: A-chiang-ke) and Jitato (Chinese phoneticization: Chih-ta-t'e). Most of the personnel involved were Uighors.? Instead of confining itself to the area north of the Harbin-Manchulai Railroad, the movement spread as far south as the Jarin League (Che-li-ru Meng) and eventually came to influence some of the troops of the Inner Mongolian People's Self Protection Army (IMPSPA). Most of the principal figures in the Party were the intelligencia who advocated the "racial principal". Slogans of the organization were as follows: Oppose the destruction of the people by the Chinese Communists; Oppose the amalgamation policy of the National Government with the Hen race as the central figures; Take a neutral attitude in future developments.

(Washington Note: See-4844 for a previous report on the Uighors of Manchuria.)

2. Trouble beset the new party when Kburgun (Chinese phoneticization: Ke-arh-kun) who claims to be a Mongol but is actually a Chinese Communist, betrayed Kowajameta* (Chinese phoneticization: Sha-la-hu), commander and vice-commander respectively of the "Guerrilla Division" of the IMPSPA. Both of these men had been in the organization since the beginning. Kburgun was the political member (?advisor) of the division and was thus in a position to know all developments. In June 1947 some thirty members of the party, including Kowajameta and Sharhu were arrested and judged at Chalinten where they are still detained. Because of these arrests, the 38 Regiment of the 5 Division of the IMPSPA refused to assist the Communists in the "Fifth Offensive". As a result of this refusal, this regiment is being closely watched by the Communists and is not given the freedom of movement accorded the other Mongol units (in Communist dominated areas.)
3. For the time being the "Righteous Party" movement is suppressed. However, since the "racial principle" is one of its doctrines and because there is sympathy for the party among the Inner Mongolians, it is felt that the movement will continue underground.

(Washington Note: See 10409 and 10410 for biographical information on persons mentioned above.)

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SUBJECT Political Information: Leaders of the Inner Mongolian "Righteous Party"

NO 10409

DATE OF INFORMATION: 2 September 1947

SOURCE Acquaintance of Achingga and Jitato

1. Achingga (Chinese phoneticization: A-ch'ong-ke, Chinese name PAO Kuo-liang 包國梁), a leader of the secret Inner Mongolian organization called the "Righteous Party" was born in Jaloid Banner (122-20, 46-50) of Jerim League and is 42 years old. After graduation from the Taitaihar Chinese Normal School, he went to Japan to study engineering in the Osaka Engineering College where he received his degree. When the Meingan (Puppet) Army was established in September 1932, Achugga, a lieutenant, worked in headquarters as an aide to Patamalaputan, the commander. Because Achingga disliked being a puppet, he resigned after two or three months and returned to Taitaihar where he became assistant principal of the Mongolian Banner Normal School and later head of the Chalautun Normal School and the First Provincial High School. Many of his former students became members of the "Righteous Party". After the surrender he went to Wangyehsiso to participate in the autonomy advement. In February 1946 he accompaied Manibatata to Peiping to Jamana autonomy for Eastern Inner Mongolia. In June 1946 when the Eastern Mongolian Autonomous Government was replaced by the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government, Achingga became head of the Jalaid Banner. It is not known whether he was arrested by the Chinese Communists along with other members of the Coalentum group of the "Righteous Party".

2. Jitato (Chinese phoneticization: Chih-ta-t'e, Chinese name MENG Kuci-chin 孟克其), another leader of the "Righteous Party", was born in the Botha (?Pakto, 121-55, 48-40) area and is a Dagoon. At the establishment of Manchukuo he was made the head of the Civil Government section of East Hsingan Province. Later he was appointed head of the Botha (?Pakto) Banner which was considered to be the highest post in the four banners of East Hsingan Province. When the was ended, Jitato was head of Botha Banna and administrative head of all the Hsingan eastern districts. It is not known what happened to him after the surrender. Jitato is a strong "racial principle" advocate, a conservative in action and well respected among the Deghors.

SUBJECT Military Division Protection

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SOURCE Former

(Shanghai Note: See organization recent)

1. Comjansha (Chinese name 包啟文), Mongolian People's Republic Banner (122-20, Manchukao he was Cadet School w class. He ran language was g ing graduation the Hsingan (p mander of the Mantung? (618? autonomy moven commander of a became comman and respected affairs of th Formon? (125-

2. Sharha? (Chinese name 包俊德) is He was born in the first cla twentieth, in the Hsingan A

NO 10409

SUBJECT Military Information: Commanders of the "Guerrilla Division" of the Inner Mongolian Peoples Self Protection Army

NO 10410

DATE OF INFORMATION: 2 September 1947

SOURCE Former instructor at the Hsingan Military Cadet School

(Shanghai Note: See -10409 for previous report on the secret political organization recently suppressed by the Chinese Communists.)

1. Comjansha (Chinese phoneticization: Ko-ma-cha-su-ao, Chinese name: PAO Chi-won 包啟文), is the commander of the "Guerrilla Division" of the Inner Mongolian Peoples Self Protection Army (IMPSPA). He was born in Jalaid Banner (122-20, 46-50) and is 33 years old. Before the establishment of Manchukao he was a lieutenant in the Chinese army. When the Hsingan Military Cadet School was established in 1934, he entered as a member of the first class. He ranked Fourth or Fifth in school. Since his command of Japanese language was good, he later attended the Japanese Army Cadet School. Following graduation he returned to Manchukao and received a company command in the Hsingan (puppet) Army. At the time of the surrender he was vice-commander of the Hsingan 6 Cavalry Regiment, (?) Army which was stationed at Mantung? (618?-50, 43-51). After the surrender he participated in the autonomy movement at Wangychmino? and was stationed in Jalaid Banner as commander of a cavalry regiment. With the expansion of the IMPSPA, he became commander of the "Guerrilla Division". He is a superior politician and respected of his men. He now has jurisdiction over the (?military affairs of the) four banners: Jalaid, Barbet? (125-95,46-25), Oarlai Formon? (125-00,44-50), and Corios Rear? (126-00, 45-45).
2. Sharha? (Chinese phoneticization: Cha-la-ha, Chinese name: PAO Gmores? 包俊德) is the vice-commander of the "Guerrilla Division" of the IMPSPA. He was born in Gnuhat Banner? and is 32 or 33 years old. He was a member of the first class of the Hsingan Military Cadet School. He graduated twentieth, in the class of ninety. After graduation he was stationed with the Hsingan Army in the Rallar area?.

DATE OF INFORMATION: March - April 1949

SOURCE paragraphs 1,3,5-7: Mongol political leader
 paragraph 2 : Mongol, National Assembly delegate, from a member of LI Yung-hsin's Clique.
 paragraph 4 : Mongol, member of various Inner Mongolian governments, from the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission.

1. On 4 and 5 April 1949, Prince TE convened a conference in Alashan Banner (105-36, 38-46) which was attended by the various Mongol league and banner heads of Ulanjap League, Yehojo League, Alashan Banner and others, in all, about 21 leaders, including Prince TA, Dagwooser and others. The following resolutions were made at this conference:
 - a. To convene a General Assembly of Mongol leaders in the Northwest about the end of April 1949.
 - b. After this General Assembly, to establish an "Inner Mongolian Autonomy Preparatory Committee".
 - c. To hold the General Assembly meeting in Sanhsingkung (三興公), Alashan Banner.
 - d. To elect representatives at the General Assembly to be sent to Nanking to request autonomy for Mongolia.
 - e. To raise funds from the local areas after the compilation of a temporary budget.
2. To represent the pre-Kuomintang Mongols, LI Yung-hsin is planning to dispatch LIU Liem-k'e (劉廉克), and HSUEH Hsing-ju (薛興儒) to Alashan Banner to participate in the General Assembly, although Prince TE has not invited them to attend. At present, both LIU and HSUEH are in Taichung, Taiwan.
3. The Inner Mongoln Autonomous Government (XMAG), during March and early April 1949 sent secret letters notifying the various leagues and banners in the Northwest to dispatch representatives quickly to Wangyehmiao to participate in the government under YUN Tse. Otherwise, "the full responsibility for whatever consequences that may result shall lie with the respective heads of the wanted leagues & banners". To date, however, none has responded to this call from the Communists.
4. During early April 1949 Prince TE sent official letters to the Mongolian Tibetan Affairs Commission in Nanking requesting funds for Mongol activities in Alaskan Banner. The Commission then made a formal request to the Central Government asking for an appropriation of GK \$10,000,000 and for airplane facilitation for sending Mongols in Nanking to Alaskan to join Prince TE.
5. Mongol military leader Thadui (WU Ku-t'ing) left Taipei about 15 April for the Northwest to unify his troops and discuss the Mongolian Restoration Association with Racialist mongol leaders there. He had planned to join

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Prince TE (earlier but delayed his trip because of the death of one of his relatives and because the time was not then ripe for his arrival in the Northwest. Mongols to organize in the Alaskan area of Ninghsia Province, is using the Mongols as a north-northeast buffer against the Chinese Communists, they fear that MA may take further advantage of their situation and put on considerable pressure to gain control of the Mongol troops in the Shanpa (107-08, 40-59) area which have infiltrated into western Mongolia from Chinese Communist-controlled areas of Inner Mongolia. Since the majority of these Mongol troops lack supplies, food and clothing, particularly after their long journey westward, and since the Mongol leaders in the Northwest are not financially able to offer such for food and clothing, MA will probably try to take over these Mongol units in return for supplying them. One of Ulaudui's primary objectives in going to the Northwest is to see that MA does not gain control of these Mongol units, but at the same time he will try to find some way to feed and clothe them.

6. His problems are further complicated now by the activities of Mongol military leader PAI Kai-feng (白海峰), who is attempting to gain control of these troops and who is not very highly trusted by the Racialist Mongols. During March 1949, a story was current that Suhehagator, acting brigade commander of Ulmdui's units proceeding to western Mongolia, was assassinated by AO Yu-can (鄂友三), a former subordinate of FU Tso-i. Racial mongols returning to Alaskan Banner from Shampa state that this was a rumor intentionally spread by PAI Hai-feng in order that he might gain control of these troops. Mongol troops arriving in Shanpa state that Snhsuegater is in good health and still in command of his troops.
7. Another complication in the Northwest is Prince TE's poor health. Racialist Mongols are afraid that if TE should die, much of the unity gained to date in the Northwest might be lost in the maneuvering for TE's position on the part of other princes already well established in the Northwest but whose racial consciousness is not extreme and whose prestige does not equal that of TE.

SUBJECT Relations of Certain Mongol Leaders with
the CC Clique

NO 25498

DATE OF INFORMATION: 1 May 1949, except as noted

SOURCE American observer, from three Racial Mongol leaders.

1. The following Mongol leaders are reported to have either actual connections with the CC Clique, or potential ones insofar as the CC Clique is seeking their support.¹

Batobilig, former Banner Affairs Commissioner for Center Kung (Chungkung or Urat Center) Banner, Ulanbatai League. After 1945, the Chinese authorities induced him, through pressure, to join the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics. He is close to the CC Clique, and also takes orders from Prince LIN.

CH'I Chung-yi (奇忠義), grandson of Prince T'U, former head of Yehojo League. CH'I is Jasag of Chunwang Banner, Yehojo League, and a delegate to the National Assembly. The CC Clique frequently uses him to its advantage, for he is young and has little knowledge of political affairs, and is trying to win his support.

Damirinwanchug (Chinese name: TA Hsiao-yün 達敏雲), third younger brother of Prince TA, the chief of Alashan Banner. He owes his position in the Legislative Yuan to the CC Clique, which arranged his appointment to gain Prince TA's favor. Damirinwanchug is a friend of HO Chao-lin.

Galbinga (Alabinga; Chinese name: PAO Kuo-min 包國民), a subordinate of Ukudui (WU Ku-ting). The CC Clique is trying to win him over, in order to gain control of part of Ukudui's troops. He is naive and inexperienced.

HO Chao-lin (何兆麟), also known as HO Jui-wu (何瑞五), an important Mongol member of the CC Clique. When he recently accompanied Prince TE from Peiping to Nanking and thence to the Northwest, it may have been for the purpose of checking on TE's activities and preventing their success. He is very close to Prince TA and has influenced him and others, including CH'I Chung-yi, against Dagwaosor and his associates.

PA Yün-ying (巴雲英), widow of the Jasag of East Kung (Urat Forward) Banner, Ulanbatai League. In 1937 she fled with her husband from the westward advance of the Japanese. After her husband died she became politically active, and had the support of FU Tso-yi. She organized the Chinese and Mongols who had escaped from East Kung Banner into a Peace Preservation Corps, with herself as commanding officer. In spite of her dislike of the domination of Mongolian affairs by Chinese, she would not give up the power she has in order to advocate Mongolian autonomy. She has recently made overtures to the CC Clique, which is eager to cooperate with her. She is a delegate from Ulanbatai League to the National Assembly.

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PAI Hai-feng. While studying at Far Eastern University in the USSR, PAI joined the Communist Party, but when the Third Internationale sent him to Inner Mongolia, he changed his mind and joined the Kuomintang (KMT). He served as chief of the Peace Preservation Section under Prince TE's Pailingmiao regime, but was put under surveillance after he had ordered the "Blue Shirt Society" to assassinate HAN Feng-lin, a pro-Japanese officer on Prince TE's staff. He fled, and joined FU Tso-yi's group, where he gained favor by urging the Peace Preservation Corps under the Mongolian Affairs Commission to defect. In 1937 he formed a Mongol cavalry unit which saw no action. His importance in the CC Clique dates from this period. After a disagreement with FU Tso-yi, PAI joined HU Tsung-nan and became commander of a cavalry division which was later made a brigade, which he commanded with the rank of lieutenant general. In 1948 he left the army, after a disagreement with HU Tsung-nan. In the 1948 session of the National Assembly, PAI helped defeat a bill for Mongolian autonomy, and also gave the Central Government authorities a list of the names of Mongolian nationalists. As second-in-command of FAN Han-chieh's army group, PAI attempted to establish a unit in the Northwest, but failed. His presence in the Northwest is not to aid in the movement to gain Mongolian autonomy, but to prevent it, and to gain control of Ukudui's troops.² He has been trying to persuade Prince TA to oppose Prince TE.

Prince TA, whose full name is Darijap (Dalijaya), feudal lord of Alashan Banner and Tingyuanying (105-36, 38-48). He is one of the wealthiest and most powerful princes in the Northwest, and the last descendent of one of the most reactionary feudal families in Inner Mongolia. For many generations his family intermarried with Manchu royalty. Prince TA was raised in Peiping and neither speaks the Mongolian language nor understands his people. His main support comes from the residents of Tingyuanying; the village Mongols dislike him but do not dare oppose him openly. He formerly dealt severely with those who manifested democratic leanings. For his personal ends he has opposed MA Hung-kuei, thereby creating a good impression with persons ignorant of his real motives. He is very close to the Mongol members of the CC Clique, and has been intimate with LI Yung-hsin, PAI Hai-feng and HO Chao-lin.

Wangchindorji (Chinese name: WANG P'eng-ch'eng 汪鹏程), Jasag of Dalat (Ordos Left Flank Rear) Banner, Yehejo League. He was educated in Peiping. At one time he killed some of FU Tso-yi's officers and was imprisoned. Until the fall of Nanking he was head of the Nanking Mongolian Residents' Association. He is anti-Chinese, but the CC Clique is trying to get his support.

2. The following Mongols are either actively opposed to the CC Clique, or known to have no connections with it.

Altanwachir (Duke A), head of Sunit Right Banner, Silingol League. He was in Communist areas for two years, but finally fled to Nationalist territory. He is opposed to the CC Clique.

Prince AO (Wachirhoyegto), son of Prince SHA, the former chief of Yehejo

League and Jasag of Jasag (Ordos Right Flank Forward Latest) Banner. In 1942 he took part in the "26 March incident" against reclamation and oppression. He has great respect for Prince TE, and no connections with the CC Clique.

HAN Yu-ju (韓裕如), native of Jungar (Ordos Left Flank Forward) Banner, Yehejo League, and chief of staff of Atog (Ordos Right Flank Central) Banner Peace Preservation Corps. He once participated in the Yehejo League movement against feudalism. He has been in Outer Mongolia, and is a Mongolian nationalist with no CC Clique affiliations.

Jirgalang³ (Chinese name: CHI Chih-hsiang 吉致祥), a native of Powang (Horchin Left Flank Rear) Banner, Jirum League. During the Pailingmiao autonomous movement, his devotion to his work won the appreciation of Prince TE. Under the Mongolian Autonomous Government, Jirgalang was head of the Civil Affairs Department of Yehejo League and later deputy chief of Ulanhab League; he has the respect of Prince A, Prince LIN, and the people of both Yehejo and Ulanhab Leagues. In 1946 he was appointed commissioner of the Hsingan Provincial Government and later was vice chairman of the Northeast President's Headquarters. He recently fled from Mukden to Peiping, and from there to Ningshia. The Wangyehmiao regime considers him a war criminal. His dislike of the CC Clique is reciprocated.

Joonasoto (Chinese name: CHAO Hui-ch'uan 趙匯川), a native of Botha. He has been a subordinate of Prince TE for many years and has participated in various autonomy movements, but is not strictly a man of his word. He was formerly the representative of the Pailingmiao Mongolian Affairs Commission in Peiping, and was later head of the Foreign Affairs Department of the Mongolian Government. He has no connections with the CC Clique.

Ombator, a native of Darhan Banner, Jirum League. He was an official under the Manchukuo regime, and later worked for the Wangyehmiao Autonomous Government, from which he fled because of dissatisfaction with the Communist Party. Ukudui has sent him to maintain liaison with the Mongol troops who are moving west. He dislikes the CC Clique.

PA Wen-chun (巴文俊), also known as PA Wei-sung (巴維松), a native of Tumet Special Banner. He is a graduate of Lyons University in France, and has been a member of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission and chief of its Mongolian Affairs Department. He is influential within his native banner. He is opposed to the Mongol members of the CC Clique, and has disagreed openly with PAI Hai-feng because of the latter's complete reliance on the Central Government.

Dagwooser. He is opposed to the CC Clique and the Mongol nobility.

Shongno (Shono or Hsiungno), son of Prince LIN. He has been a first lieutenant in the Mongolian army and a major general in the Chinese army, as well as a delegate to the National Assembly. He is very much opposed to the CC Clique.

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Prince LIN (Rinkung (Center Kung) TE's autonomy who has curbed

1. Washington CC strongly opposed

2. See 24168, par

3. See 4866.

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3. The relations of the following three Mongols to the CC Clique were not stated, or not clearly defined.

Prince A (Altanwachir), chief of Yehejo League. He was also a league chief under the Mongolian autonomous regime. He is dissatisfied with the Chinese administration of Mongolia and has suffered at the hands of FU Tso-yi. The latter experience has made him very cautious; he does not trust the CC Clique, but will not oppose them openly.

Darijap, a native of Jooda League. He was formerly commander of a Mongol regiment in the Hsingan army, under the Manchukuo regime. Since 1945 he has been engaged in military activities against the Chinese Communists. Ukudui has sent him to maintain liaison with his troops in the Northwest.

Prince LIN (Rinchinsenggo), chief of Ulanhab League and Jasag of Chung-kung (Center Kung or Urat Center) Banner. He has taken part in all Prince TE's autonomy movements since 1933. In 1944 he was arrested by FU Tso-yi who has curbed LIN's activities since that time.

1. Washington Comment. The information was received from persons who are strongly opposed to the CC Clique, and may be colored by their attitude.
2. See 24168, para. 6
3. See 4866.

SUBJECT Developments in Connection with Prince TE's
Autonomy Movement

NO 27124

DATE OF INFORMATION: April - May 1949

SOURCE Educated Mongol official from Racial Mongol leaders.

The following report, though out of date, may be of interest as background information on the progress of the Mongol autonomy movement under Prince TE.

1. Prince Te was anxious to obtain recognition for the racial autonomy of Mongolia before the collapse of the Nationalist Government of China, for the following reasons:
 - a. Recognition of Mongolian autonomy by the Chinese Government would give the Mongols official standing so that they could negotiate openly with the United States. On the other hand, explicit refusal by the Nationalist Government to recognize Mongolian autonomy would enable the Mongols to inform the world that the Chinese have oppressed the Mongols, broken their promises to them, and refused to relent even when they were in no position to save themselves from disaster, and that as a consequence, the Mongols had no recourse but to seek independence.
 - b. He wished to make preparations for a future government-in-exile, or for an underground government.
2. Te did not hope for any real aid from the Chinese Government; his one desire was for a definite reply, preferably in the form of a simple statement: "Autonomy for Mongolia is hereby approved." To avoid complications, he hoped to have his request considered and approved while the Legislative Yuan was not in session. In the event of disapproval, he intended to continue his efforts alone.
3. The Mongol members of the CC Clique¹, as opposed to Prince Te, did not desire Mongolian autonomy except as a regional, not racial, autonomy under the direction of the Central Government authorities. Should the Chinese Government refuse to approve Mongolian autonomy, they would not participate in an autonomy movement. Their main desire was to obtain material aid from the Nationalist Government, including arms for PAI Hai-feng's¹ troops, so that CC Clique influence would be increased in Mongolia, and in order to give them control over the Mongols.
4. With regard to a Mongolian army, Prince Te wishes it to be built up from the armed Mongol units which have withdrawn from Communist areas (including the Ukudui unit, the Boyandolgor unit, and approximately 10,000 troops from Silingol League and Chahar). He also advocates that the armed units in the leagues and banners not yet under Communist domination be re-organized into Peace Preservation Units to guard the local areas. He is opposed to any attempt to incorporate the Mongol units into the Nationalist Army, where he believes they would be uselessly sacrificed in China's civil war. The CC Clique proposal, to place all armed Mongol units under the command of PAI Hai-feng, is based on the argument that PAI's troops are already organized and could provide supplies. Prince TE recognizes that

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the question of supplies is a major weakness in his plan, but believes that PAI would not hesitate to use Mongol troops in the civil war.

5. At the Mongol conference at Tingyuanying, Alagshan Banner, in April 1949, the efforts of PAI Hai-feng and HO Jui-wu (HO Chao-lin)¹ succeeded in making the relations between Prince Te and Ta¹ somewhat strained, although they were excellent at the beginning of the meeting. When Prince Te was unanimously proposed for the chairmanship, it was the CC Clique members who pointed out that it would be impossible for the chairman to be the representative to the central Government in Canton. Prince Te, unwilling to entrust the mission to Canton to anyone but himself, accepted a position as vice chairman. The CC Clique thereupon elected Damirinwanchug¹, rather than Prince Ta, as the other vice chairman, to diminish Prince Te's prestige.
6. Prince Te's determination to go to Canton in person, in spite of his recent illness and lack of funds, was prompted largely by his distrust of the CC Clique Mongols, in whom he is greatly disappointed. He feared that they would not demand Mongol autonomy, particularly racial autonomy. He also felt that his reputation and social standing would be useful in carrying on negotiations with LI Tsung-jen and others, and desired the opportunity to extend to his friends in Canton a personal invitation to return with him to Mongolia. His trip was financed by Prince Lin (Rinchinsengga)¹, who accompanied him to Canton.
7. On 24 May 1949, LI Tsung-jen told Prince Te that he personally, and in principle, approved granting autonomy to Mongolia, but that the legal problems involved required careful study. On another occasion LI said to some Racial Mongol leaders who were discussing autonomy with him: "What was impossible to grant in the past is now possible." The Mongols felt that LI was more open-minded than CHIANG Kai-shek, and that they could approach him directly, whereas their only access to CHIANG was through the CC Clique.
8. In general, no Mongol in Canton, regardless of his clique affiliations, could openly oppose autonomy for Mongolia, but there was no agreement on the degree of autonomy desired. PAI Yun-ti approves of Mongol autonomy, but dares not commit himself openly. Most of the middle-of-the-road Mongol leaders are in accord with Prince Te's plans.
9. Rashidongdog (HSI Chen-to) was informed by SU Ting (蘇挺), chief of the Education Bureau of Suiyuan Province, that he and Governor TUNG Chi-wu would be glad to support Prince TE's autonomy movement, if they were sure that he was anti-Communist. However, they feared that Te might have Soviet backing.² In the meantime, Darijap¹, having established contact with Ukudui's troops at Liuhoyingtzu (六合營子), reported that they were under TUNG Chi-wu and being very well treated. K'ANG (康), TUNG Chi-wu's chief of staff, whom Prince TE had met in Ninghsia, agreed to turn the Mongol units over to the Mongols, if they were not taken over by PAI Hai-feng before arrangements could be made. Prince Te was to take this matter up with the Nationalist authorities.

10. In order to circumvent any efforts of the CC Clique to gain control over the future Mongolian autonomous organization, Prince Te's group felt that they must pay special attention to the Mongolian People's Representative Assembly scheduled to be held in July 1949. They estimated that Prince Te had excellent chances of controlling the representatives from Silingol and Chahar Leagues, and from Hulunbuir and Botha; considerably better than even chances of controlling the delegates from Jirum, Jooda, Ulanbatai and Yehejo Leagues and from Bjino Banner; approximately even chances of controlling those from Tsinghai and various other areas; but rather poor chances of controlling those from Josoto League and Alagshan Banner.³ They were trying to have the new organization located in Chungkung (Central Kung) Banner, Ulanbatai League, rather than in Alagshan Banner.

11. The future policies of Prince Te include the following points:

- a. Ties with the United States are to be strengthened in preparation for the founding of a Mongol nation.
- b. Mongol aristocrats with advanced ideas are to be asked to renounce their special privileges voluntarily, so that Mongolia may become more democratic.
- c. An attempt is to be made to get as much ECA aid for Mongolia as possible, and a definite program is to be set up to better the living conditions of the people in a systematic manner.
- d. The sacrifice of Mongol troops in China's civil war is to be prevented.

12. Rashidongdog and Uljiboyan (WU Hsi-hsien or WU Lo-chi)⁷ decided, in May 1949, to go to the Northwest. Many Mongol students in Kweilin and Canton were also eager to return to the Northwest, and requested Prince Te to arrange for their transportation. Te was in no position to assist them.

1. See 25498.

2. Source Comment. This appears to be a rumor spread by FU Tso-yi's clique in an effort to discredit Prince Te.

3. Washington Comment. It seems strange that Te can count on so little control in the area where he has been based.

SUBJECT Prince Te
Mongol Au

DATE OF INFORMATION

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(Attachment)

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SUBJECT Prince Te's Official Petition to LI Tsung-jen for Mongol Autonomy

NO 29342

DATE OF INFORMATION: April 1949

SOURCE A Racial Mongol leader.

This report is a translation of the petition submitted by Prince Te to LI Tsung-jen through the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission (MTAC) and Premier HO Ying-ch'in and the MTAC's cover letter. One copy of the petition was delivered to the MTAC on 23 May. On 24 May Prince Te personally handed a copy to LI Tsung-jen, and on 25 May Prince Te personally handed a copy to CHIA Ching-te, Vice-President of the Executive Yuan.

To: President HO, Executive Yuan

The MTAC Office has acknowledged receipt of a written petition dated 23 April 1949 and signed by Altanwachir, Demchugdongrob and 47 other representatives of the various Inner Mongolian leagues and banners. For the content of the petition, see attachment.

It has been learned that representatives of the various Inner Mongolian leagues and banners held a meeting at Tingyuanying in Alagshan Banner in Ninghsia Province from 13 to 15 April this year, and that it was decided to organize an Inner Mongolian Autonomy Preparatory Committee. In addition, a chairman, vice-chairmen and standing committee members of the said committee, together with representatives from Nanking, were elected to come to Canton to present this petition. In light of the above events and the seriousness of the present national situation, it seems that approval of Mongol autonomy should be granted so as to unite the frontier and facilitate defense against the Communist enemy. The opinion of this office and the original petition are submitted herewith to your office for examination. Your instruction is requested on whether the petition should be granted.

(signed) PAI Yun-t'i
Chairman, MTAC

(Attachment)

23 April 1949

This is to request that approval of Inner Mongolian autonomy be officially announced so as to stabilize Mongol banners and strengthen national defense. The area of our country is vast and minor races have spread themselves far and wide in the border area. National defense cannot depend upon armed forces alone: it is necessary to increase the "centripetal" force of minor races so as to unite them sincerely and offer them the opportunity to devote their best efforts to the nation and the people. Our Inner Mongolia has a population of nearly 2,000,000 and our cultural, educational and economic standards have improved day by day to the point at which we are now able to assume partial responsibility for the nation and shoulder our own political

affairs. Knowing this fact and following Dr. SUN Yat-sen's doctrine of San Min Chu I and the rising tide of racial liberation all over the world, we Inner Mongolian people have for ten years been working and pleading for self-government. Being aware of international and domestic trends and the importance of a united Inner Mongolia, and searching for a way to save ourselves and the nation, we held a meeting on 13 April of this year, summoning representatives from the various Inner Mongolian leagues and banners for a discussion of overall policy. The following was decided:

1. To petition the Central Government for approval of Inner Mongolian autonomy so that we can resist aggression and establish a strong national defense. This agrees with Dr. SUN's statement, "Within the nation, the various racial governments should be supported and given the right of self-determination and self-control."

Following this meeting, we established the Inner Mongolian Autonomy Preparatory Committee, in preparation for strengthening national defense and stabilizing our own forces so as to release the Central Government from its "problem in the north". However, because of the urgent situation, it is eagerly requested that the Mongol people be given an opportunity to show their patriotism and loyalty and their anxiety to save themselves. It is further requested that you give a prompt decision on Inner Mongolian autonomy so as to be in conformity with national policy and to strengthen the frontier. It will be good for the Mongol banners. It will be good for the nation.

To be submitted with respect to Acting President LI

(signed) Representatives of the Inner Mongolian leagues and banners:*

Altanwachir	Ayorjana	Tobchi
Rinchinsengge	Gunjap	YUN Ying-fei
Damirinwangchug	Batobilig	(雲英飛)
Dugurensang	Mungunjiya	Erteniborto
Shongnodongdob	Urgun	Goldawa
Sharebdorji	CH'EN Chien-jung (陳建榮)	SE So (色索)
Hasertoni	Sewang	Nomondawa
Nasoubuhe	LU Jen-ch'ing (魯仁慶)	Agtongga
LO-Batomunghe	Bemchugdongrob	Gombo
Giljintai	Bayanhan	Matai
Jonasoto	Wachirhuyegtu	Kungseng
K'ANG Ching-kuo (康靖國)	Nomonbagator	Ulji boyan
Botbatsar	Serengnamjil	PAO Kuo-min
Lhawangjap	Urgundalai	(鮑國民)
Dagwaoser	Darjaya	Sharab
Tumenjirgalaug	Shongno	Wangchinjap
		HAI Fu-ch'uan
		(海福泉)
		Tumendalger

*Field comment. Only 48 signatures appear on the document.

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